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THE MANAGEMENT SIDE OF DUE PROCESS:
SOME THEORETICAL AND LITIGATION
NOTES ON THE ASSURANCE OF
ACCURACY, FAIRNESS, AND
TIMELINESS IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF
SOCIAL WELFARE
CLAIMS*
Jeny L. Mashawt
Virtually no American is likely to live out his life without
making a claim under some federally funded or administered
benefit or compensation program. Our system of national social
welfare legislation includes among its major programs Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security),' Medicare and
Medicaid,2 Veterans' Pensions and Compensation,3 Categorical
Public Assistance (Aid to Families with Dependent Children 4 and
the new federal Sup'lementary Security Income Program under
title XVI of the Social Security Act),5 Unemployment Insurance, 6
and Workmen's Compensation.7 These programs provide basic
protection against a multitude of serious economic hazards which
may at some time affect us all. Because of the magnitude of the
* Much of the background research for this Article was done in connection with a
report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States. On the basis of that
report the Conference adopted its Recommendation 73-3, "Quality Assurance Systems in the
Adjudication of Claims of Entitlement to Benefits on Compensation," reprinted in the
1972-73 Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States. The Conference, however, is
in no way responsible for the assertions and conclusions made in this Article. A Conference
Recommendation is not an approval or adoption of the underlying consultant's report.
Moreover, the discussion here goes considerably beyond the scope of the original report to
the Conference.
My thanks to Don Hemke of the third-year class at the University of Virginia Law
School for his able assistance in preparing this Article for publication.
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Consultant, Administrative Conference of
the United States. B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1964, Tulane University; Ph.D. 1969, University of
Edinburgh.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-429 (1970).
2 Id. §§ 139 5 -1 3 9 6 (g) (1970).
3 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-361 (1970) (compensation); id. §§ 501-562 (1970) (pensions).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1970).
5 Id. §§ 1381-1383(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
6 Id. §§ 501-504 (1970).
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) (Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1970) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act).
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public expenditures under these programs,8 the virtual universality
of their coverage, 9 and the value of the benefits available under
them to individual claimants or recipients, 10 there has developed
8 Appropriations for "human resources" increased from $2.7 billion in 1945 to $35.4
billion in 1965 to $113.7 billion in 1973 to $157.6 billion recommended for 1975. The total
federal budget also increased, but at a dramatically lower rate-from $95.2 billion in 1945 to
$118.4 billion in 1965 to $246.5 billion in 1973 to $322.1 billion recommended for 1975.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1973,
at 75 [hereinafter cited as 1973 BUDGET]; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1975, at 51 [hereinafter cited as 1975 BUDGET].
Veterans' benefits and services, which in 1945 made up nearly 40% of the human resources
budget, while increasing from $1.1 billion in 1945 to $12.0 billion in 1973 to $14.1 billion
recommended for 1975, accounted for just over 10% of the human resources budget in 1973
and less than 10% of the recommended human resources budget for 1975. Income security,
which increased frbm $1.2 billion in 1945 to $25.7 billion in 1965 to $73.1 billion in 1973 to
$104.0 billion recommended for 1975, makes up nearly two-thirds of the present human
resources budget. Of the income security programs in 1973, Old Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance was allocated $48.3 billion, net of offsetting receipts ($65.1 billion
recommended for 1975), Unemployment Insurance, $5.4 billion ($6.6 billion recommended
for 1975), Old-Age Assistance, $1.6 billion, Aid to the Blind, $65 million, Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled, $946 million ($4.7 billion recommended for
Supplementary Security Income in 1975, which replaces assistance to the aged, blind, and
disabled), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, $4.3 billion ($4.6 billion recommended
for 1975), and Emergency Assistance, $26 million.
The federal budget for health programs, likewise, has increased dramatically. In 1945,
$200 million was spent on health programs, in 1965, $1.7 billion, and in 1973, $18.4 billion.
President Nixon has recommended $28.0 billion for 1975. Of the health budget in 1973,
$9.5 billion net of offsetting receipts was spent for Medicare (trust funds) ($16.7 billion
recommended for 1975) and $4.6 billion for Medicaid ($6.6 billion recommended for 1975).
1973 BUDGET 144, 154, 157; 1975 BUDGET 119, 125, 127.
9 In fiscal year 1973, an estimated 2.6 million veterans and survivors received $3.8
billion in compensation for service-related injuries, and 2.4 million beneficiaries received
$2.7 billion in pensions for nonservice-related injuries. 1973 BUDGET 164-65. More than one
million veterans in 1973 shared approximately $2.5 billion in federal outlays for veterans'
medical care. 1975 BUDGET 132, 135. An estimated 4.7 million aged persons were
reimbursed through Medicare for hospitalization expenses in 1973, and 10.8 million aged
persons were reimbursed for physician and other outpatient costs. 1973 BUDGET 147. An
estimated 24 million low-income persons received Medicaid benefits in 1973. Id. For 1975,
28.6 million Medicaid recipients are forecasted. 1975 BUDGET 121. An estimated 17.5 million
retired persons and their dependents and 3.1 million disabled workers and their dependents
received Social Security benefits in 1973. 1973 BUDGET 155. In 1975, the total number of
Social Security beneficiaries is expected to reach 32.6 million. 1975 BUDGET 126. The
National Center for Social Statistics (NCSS) reports that 14.9 million persons received public
assistance maintenance payments in May 1973; 1.3% less than the 15.1 million receiving such
benefits in May 1972. Of these 14.9 million, 11.0 million received Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, 1.2 million, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 78,300, Aid
to the Blind, 1.9 million, Old-Age Assistance, 780,000, General Assistance and 15,900,
Emergency Assistance. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Public Assistance
Statistics May 1973, Sept. 10, 1973, table 3 (NCSS Report A-2).
10 For example, in June 1973, the average monthly payment per recipient of Old-Age
Assistance was $78.78, of Aid to the Blind, $110.51, of Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, $107.85, of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, $54.19 ($188.63 per family),
of General Assistance, $73.21 ($111.97 per case), and of Emergency Assistance, $173.92 per
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an increasing interest in the accuracy, fairness, and timeliness of
the adjudication of claims for social welfare benefits."
A similar interest informs this Article. But, before developing
its somewhat peculiar perspective, it is necessary to attempt to
specify what is meant by "accuracy," "fairness," and "timeliness" of
"adjudications" in the context of the social welfare claims process.
"Adjudication" encompasses any determination of eligibility or
amount of benefits at any stage of a social welfare claims process.
This is a reasonably straightforward usage, but it is considerably
broader than the lawyer's customary image of an adjudication as a
decision made after a trial-type evidentiary proceeding. "Accuracy"
involves the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an
adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation and with
an appropriate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts.
Accuracy is thus the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully
family. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Public Assistance Statistics June 1973,
Oct. 16, 1973, tables 4-7, 9, 10 (NCSS Report A-2). In fiscal year 1975, the average monthly
payment per retired worker in the Social Security retirement program will be $203. 1975
BUDGET 126. These amounts represent not only the margin between survival and
destitution, but a substantial lump sum as well, if the stream of income is capitalized to
current worth.
1 See Boasberg, Washington Beat: Toward an Adjudicative System for Welfare Reform, 4
URBAN LAW. 348 (1972); Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Problem
of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964); Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A
Warning from the Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681; Dooley & Goldberg,
Search for Due Process in the Administration of Social Welfare Programs, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 209
(1971); Fontaine, The Constitutional Law of Remedies in Welfare Litigation, 23 MAINE L. REv. 41
(197 1); Klein & Willging, Beyond Java: Redistribution of Risks in the Administration of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 490 (1973); Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local
Administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 818 (1971);
O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. CT.
REv. 161; Packard, Fair Procedure in Welfare Hearings, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 600 (1969); Pevar,
Welfare and Its Administration in South Dakota, 18 S.D.L. REv. 62 (1973); Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reinstein, The
Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights, the Poor, and the Burden of Proof in Constitutional Litigation,
44 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1970); Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the
Indiana Tuwnship Assistance System, 6 IND. L. J. 385 (1973); Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due
Process-A Study of the Implementation'of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13
W1. & MARY L. REv. 725 (1972); Smith, On the Waterfront at the Pier's Edge: The
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 114 (1970);
Thornock, Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act-Fact or
Fiction?, 42 MILITARY L. REv. 1 (1968); Washington, Welfare Grievance Machinery in New York
City, 7 HOuSTON L. REv. 620 (1970); Comment,Judcial Review and the Governmental Recovery
of Veterans' Benefits, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 288 (1969); Note, California Welfare Fair Hearings: An
Adequate Remedy, 5 U.C.D.L. REV. 542 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law: Due Process and
Compliance with Processing Requirements for Welfare Applications, 50 N.C.L. REv. 673 (1972);
Note, General Assistance Programs: Review & Remedy of Administrative Actions in Indiana, 47 IND.
L.J. 393 (1972); Note, Right to Counsel in Public Welfare Hearings, 48 BOSTON U.L. REv. 468
(1968).
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attainable. "Fairness" is the degree to which the process of making
claims determinations tends to produce accurate decisions. That a
decision is "timely" simply means that it was made within a reason-
able or a statutorily prescribed period of time after presentation of
the claim.
The thesis of this Article is that the elements of fairness or fair
procedure normally associated with due process of law in ad-
judicatory proceedings are inadequate to produce fairness in social
welfare claims adjudications. Due process in the social welfare
context therefore requires redefinition to include management
processes which will tend to assure the accuracy of claims adjudica-
tions.
The customary focus of constitutional adjudications concern-
ing whether a particular adjudicatory process is "fundamentally
fair" is on the extent to which accurate decisionmaking should be
supported by providing a directly affected party with a trial-type
hearing. Claims of unfairness are made in terms of the denial of
one or more of the attributes of trial-type procedure-specific
notice of adverse factual and legal claims, opportunity to produce
testimony and to argue orally, opportunity to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, a decision based wholly upon
the evidentiary record compiled. As a result, various combinations
of these adversary procedures have come to define due process of
law in particular judicial and administrative contexts. 12 This ap-
proach has been as typical in due process decisions concerning
social welfare claims adjudications as in other substantive areas.' 3 It
is not, therefore, a significant overstatement to suggest that, from
the traditional perspective of the legal system, adjudicatory proces-
ses which contain adequate procedural safeguards in hearings and
appellate checks on initial decisions are considered self-correcting
mechanisms for the accurate finding of facts and the authoritative
application of law to fact.
This Article argues to the contrary that the purposes, neces-
sary modes of operation, and clientele of social welfare programs
so severely limit the value of procedural safeguards and appellate
checks in assuring accurate and timely adjudication of social welfare
claims that there is a need for additional safeguards on the integ-
12 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
13 See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971); California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254" (1970).
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rity of this very important segment of the administrative process.
One such additional safeguard-a management system for assur-
ing adjudication quality in claims processing, sometimes called a
quality control or quality assurance system-will be described here
in broad outline. The remainder of the discussion is concerned
with the due process implications of such a management system
and with the possibilities for its judicial imposition on certain social
welfare programs as a matter of constitutional due process or
statutory construction. The purpose of the discussion is not to
provide a detailed analysis of the issues raised, but rather to
stimulate new ways of thinking about due process of law in the
context of social welfare programs.
I
LIMITATIONS OF TRIAL-TYPE HEARINGS AND APPEALS IN ENSURING
ACCURATE, FAIR, AND TIMELY ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS
In adversary judicial proceedings, procedural safeguards and
appellate review are generally viewed as the guardians of fairness
and accuracy. In this context, problems of accuracy and fairness
tend to duster around two dominant issues. The first is the problem
of designing systems in which a fair opportunity to contest does not
result in an equal opportunity to obfuscate and to delay. The
solution to difficulties of this type has been sought largely through
adjustments in either the procedural rules or the evidentiary sys-
tem, the adjective law governing the process of adjudication. Ef-
forts over the past several decades to develop rules which strike an
appropriate balance between the information-seeking and the
harassment potential of various discovery devices provide obvious
and familiar examples of these kinds of adjustments to the ad-
judicatory process in the courts. 14
The second problem has been the development of cost-
allocation principles to ensure that the adversary process is gener-
ally available. For if it is the adversary process which gives judicial
adjudication its assurance of fairness and accuracy, that assurance
cannot be maintained when some parties lack the resources to be
14 See W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968); Frank,
Pretrial Conferences and Discovery-Disclosure or Surprise?, 1965 INS. L.J. 661; Friedenthal,
Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962);
Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479 (1968); Symposium:
Criminal Discovery, 7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 203 (1973); Note, The Use of Discovey to Obtain
Jurisdictional Facts, 59 VA. L. REv. 533 (1973).
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effective adversaries. Although complete equality of adversaries is
not a realistic goal, certain types of resources have been recognized
as critical for success in adversary presentation. Legal counsel is
such a resource, and in criminal15 and quasi-criminal 16 proceed-
ings, constitutional due process has come to require the availability
of counsel as well as the waiver of court fees for other necessary
defense items.' 7 Civil proceedings have not yet had their "adversar-
iness" subsidized by constitutional requirements. 8 Occasionally
15 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requiring counsel at trial in state
court for misdemeanor if possible sentence includes jail term); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967) (counsel not required at taking of handwriting exemplar); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring counsel at post-indictment line-up); Douglas v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring counsel on first appeal); Gideon v. Wain~vright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (requiring counsel at trial in state court for noncapital felony); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938) (requiring counsel for criminal defendant in federal court); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requiring counsel at trial in state court for capital felony).
"6 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring appointed counsel, notice, and confron-
tation at certain juvenile proceedings). But see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(appointed counsel not required at parole revocation). Because the supposed purpose of
juvenile court--"to determine the best way to correct the child's unlawful behavior "-differs
from the purpose of criminal courts--"to convict and dispose of guilty adults"-some
attorneys view their role in juvenile proceedings as only "modified advocates." Ferster,
Courless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM
L. REv. 375, 388-89 (1971). But see McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in
the Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. Louis L.J. 561, 563 (1970) (attorney's
"true role" in juvenile proceedings is that "of an advocate to protect his client's legal rights").
" See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (free trial transcripts for appeal from
misdemeanor); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (free transcripts of preliminary
hearing); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (limited furnishing of transcripts
unconstitutional); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (free transcripts of post-conviction
hearing); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (waiver of filing fee for second level appeal);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcripts on appeal). See generally Note, The
Indigent's Rigid to a Transcript of Record, 20 KAN. L. REV. 745 (1972); Comment, Criminal
Procedure-Free Transcripts for Indigents, 51 N.C.L. REv. 621 (1973); Comment, Criminal
Law-Free Transcripts-Indigent Misdemeanants, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 321 (1973).
18 However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970) (proceedings in forma pauperis) empowers
federal courts to appoint counsel for indigents in civil cases, and while the statute grants no
"right" to counsel, failure to make an appointment may be an abuse of discretion. See
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (requiring appointment of counsel to
prosecute indigent prisoner's claim of conversion of his automobile). There is no explicit
statutory authority for compensating counsel "requested" to act for an indigent under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d). Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 486 (S.D. Tex. 1972). One district court
has noted, however, that appointment authority implicitly authorizes the commitment of
federal funds for compensation in a proper case. Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271, 275
(N.D. Cal. 1967). But see DeMaris v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
The statute also authorizes federal courts to waive certain fees and costs and to have a
trial record printed at government cost. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a), (b) (1970). Moreover, the
Supreme Court found a constitutional right of access to courts for divorce litigation in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), invalidating the'imposition of court fees and
costs for service of process which restricted petitioners' access to the courts.
The Court has refused to extend Boddie to bankruptcy (e.g., United States v. Kras, 409
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statutes 9 and judicial decisions2 0 do ameliorate the problem of the
unavailability of counsel to develop facts and arguments in worthy
claims by making lawyers' fees a cost' to be borne by the losing, and
sometimes even the winning2 ' party.
There are, however, limits on the extent to which courts and
legislators can refine adjective law without making it a dispropor-
tionate concern in litigation that purports to deal with matters of
substance. And the wisdom of increasing the potency of adver-
saries through public subsidies is always open to serious question,
U.S. 434 (1973)), and has denied certiorari in cases involving the applicability of Boddie to
child guardianship and welfare claims (e.g., Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw Co., 402 U.S. 954
(1971)). See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (sustaining Oregon statute requiring trial
on actions to evict within six days of service of complaint unless security posted, and striking
down as violative of equal protection double-bond requirement for certain appeals in such
actions). See generally Note, Constitutionality of Cost and Fee Barriers for Indigent Litigants:
Searching for the Remains of Boddie After a Kras-Landing, 48 IND. L.J. 452 (1973).
9 Numerous federal statutes authorize or require the award of attorney's fees in certain
situations. Some provide that the prevailing party "shall" recover reasonable attorney's fees.
E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (certain actions against stockyards); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)
(antitrust); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) (Fair Labor Standards Act). Other statutes provide that
courts "may" award reasonable attorney's fees. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (Securities Act
of 1933); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) ("exceptional"
patent infringement cases); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) (1970) (Civil Rights Act of 1964; public
accommodations); id. § 2000e-5(k) (equal employment opportunity); id. § 3612(c) (fair
housing). See Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1963). Even when the statute is merely permissive,
judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees may be limited by underlying statutory
policy. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (Civil Rights Act of
1964; public accommodations). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)
(Securities Act of 1934).
20 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), noted in 38 U. CHi. L.
REV. 316 (1971). Courts have been particularly willing in racial discrimination cases to award
attorney's fees even in the absence of statutory authorization. See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen, 467
F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
But see Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965). Attorney's fees also have been awarded
without statutory authorization outside the racial discrimination context. See, e.g., Yablonski
v. UMW, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973) (Labor Manage-
ment Reporting & Disclosure Act); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(maternity leave); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 942
(1972) (reapportionment). See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation,
48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301 (1973); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where
the Action is not Based on a Statute Providingfor an Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 405
(1972).
2' See, e.g., McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971) (plaintiff
awarded attorney's fees although defendant prevailed on merits, "since plaintiff was forced
to go to court to obtain the statement of reasons to which he was constitutionally entitled");
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 430 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff awarded
attorney's fees in absence of monetary or injunctive relief because plaintiff's lawsuit, by
prompting defendant's compliance with civil rights statute, "performed a valuable public
service"); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5 E.R.C. 1745 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (attorney's fees awarded
because plaintiffs rendered "public service" by ensuring purity and continued viability of
certain water supplies). See also Globus, Inc. v. Jarroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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unless litigation is viewed as an ultimate rather than as an instru-
mental end. Hence, it is not surprising to find that in recent years a
search has begun for alternatives or additions to adjective law
reform and subsidies as devices for improving the quality of
adjudicative justice. This search is evidenced by a concern for the
development of techniques of judicial administration to make the
process of adjudication more efficient, and by an increasing wil-
lingness to view the adjudicatory process as one in which the
positive management of cases and case flow to achieve accurate and
fair results is an appropriate role for the adjudicator.22 This new
focus suggests some movement away from passive judicial reliance
on adversary processes and toward positive judicial management of
adjudication. 23 When dealing with adjudications of social welfare
claims, a posture of positive management of the adjudicatory
process to ensure quality is not only appropriate, as in the judicial
system, but essential.
A. The Positive Focus of Social Welfare Claims Adjudication
Perhaps the most general consideration which supports a
management strategy for assuring accuracy, fairness, and timeli-
ness in social welfare adjudications is the positive focus inherent in
the administration of programs involving benefits and compensa-
tion. The purposes of claims adjudication in social welfare systems
are somewhat different from the purposes served by most judicial
adjudications. The adjudication of claims in social welfare pro-
grams is an outgrowth of a positive legislative program to insure or
protect qualified claimants against certain economic hazards. The
claims adjudicator's role, whether at the initial consideration of a
completed claim file or after an oral hearing, is essentially the
same-to provide benefits to eligible individuals and to deny the
claims of ineligible individuals.
This is a quite different posture from that which is customary
for a court in judicial proceedings. A court generally. has no
responsibility for "administering" the substance of legislative pro-
22 See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (H.
Jones ed. 1965); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971).
23 Pretrial hearings commonly will be ordered to narrow issues and force agreement
when the judge decides that a trial to find facts would be unnecessary. And the judge has
some discretion to find "agreement" on facts when a party vigorously protests that agree-
ment has not been reached. See, e.g., Life Music, Inc. v. Edelstein, 309 F.2d 242 (2d Cir.
1962). See generally M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN & H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
736-65 (1970).
1974] 779
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grams relevant to the lawsuit before it; and in most cases, the
adversaries may compromise their dispute and withdraw it from
judicial jurisdiction without judicial approval. This compromise
may be quite different from the judgment the court would have
rendered, but this difference in result does not mean that the
judicial process has failed. Adversaries may use the judicial forum
as a vehicle for facilitating their bargaining, and to the extent that
compromise resolves their differences, judicial involvement is suc-
cessful. One of the purposes of judicial decisionmaking-the reso-
lution of conflicts which might otherwise disturb the public peace
-is served regardless of the substance of the outcome and the
absence of judicial judgment. Additional purposes of judicial de-
cisionmaking, such as developing decisional rules which promote
efficient resource allocation, may be served as well (or better) by
the parties' bargain as by a judicial decision.24
The same opportunity for "successful" compromise solutions
between adversaries is not available in social welfare claims proces-
sing. Law in this area is not a loose framework within which private
ordering is dominant. A regime of strict law applies, and within
that regime adjudicative success can be tested only by whether the
allowed claims are consistent with the statutory and regulatory
scheme. Although a partially satisfied claimant may decline to
appeal, thus in effect compromising his claim, there is no way to
satisfy a claimant, even partially, without rendering an initial deci-
sion on the validity of his claim.
The notion that claims adjudicators are engaged, not in pro-
viding a forum for the resolution of conflicts, but rather in the
systematic and affirmative implementation of certain prescribed
legislative policies is reflected in the nonadversary and informal
procedures of most social welfare claims processes. 25 No one acts
24 Plea bargaining in criminal cases may make this feature ofjudicial process customary
in criminal as well as civil litigation.
25 For a description of the Social Security Disability claims process, see Dixon, supra note
11, at 688-89. This process is never adversary, and may be "formal," in the sense that
claimants are entitled to a highly structured evidentiary process permitting confrontation
and cross-examination, only at a de novo appeal hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge. Even at a de novo hearing, however, as Dixon found, the process remains largely
informal. Id. at 694-97.
Social Security claims procedure and applicable evidentiary principles are described in
20 C.F.R. §§ 422.130-05, 404.701-728 (1973), respectively.
The Veterans' Administration claims process is neither adversary nor formal. Initial
decisions are made by Rating Boards on the basis of documentary evidence. An informal
hearing may be held to "discuss" the claims file, but there is no formal presentation of proof.
A similar process is employed on appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals. See generally 38
C.F.R. §§ 3.100-215, 19.101-156 (1973).
[Vol. 59:772
1974] MANAGEMENT SIDE OF DUE PROCESS
specifically as the representative of the government in these pro-
ceedings. Nor is the claimant, who is usually unrepresented2 6 and
Claims under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1970),
are determined initially by claims examiners in the Office of Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion (OFEC), Department of Labor. A review by OFEC may be requested by any claimant
who is disappointed by the initial decision. Prior to review there may be a hearing; however,
the procedures at both levels are wholly informal. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 02.1-.8 (1973). Although
it is possible for a government department to oppose an award of compensation, the
regulations call for no participation by the employee's department other than a report by the
claimant's immediate supervisor. Id. § 02.1. In practice a contested claim is virtually
unknown. Further appeal may be made to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board,
but review generally is based upon the informally compiled previous record. Id. §§ 501.1-.13.
The informal claims procedure associated with Unemployment Insurance programs is
described in California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
Appeals from initial decisions are permitted under § 303(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1970), but federal regulations have not specified the nature of the appeal
proceeding beyond requiring that hearings and decisions be accomplished with the "greatest
promptness that is administratively feasible." 20 C.F.R. §§ 650.1-.4 (1973).
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1970), permits the use of formal adversary hearings, however, the history of this program
in practice suggests reliance on mediation rather than formal hearing principles. The
practice is given implicit recognition in the January 1973 revamping of claims procedure.
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 702.134-135, 702.311-316, 702.333-339 (1973).
Public assistance claims procedures are highly informal unless an "evidentiary hearing"
is requested. See 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973). At hearings, the claimant is entitled to the rights
articulated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969); see 45 C.F.P. § 205.10 (1973). ("Public
assistance" here includes Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Old-Age
Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD), and Medicaid.)
On January 1, 1974, OAA, AB, and APTD were replaced by the Supplementary
Security Income Program (SSI). Under proposed and interim rules for SSI, eligibility is
determined from information filed by the claimant. 38 Fed. Reg. 29,088 (1973). A claimant
dissatisfied with the initial determination may request reconsideration. A request for recon-
sideration is a mandatory first step for appeal except in certain terminations where, for
medical reasons, disability payments are stopped. 39 Fed. Reg. 1053 (1974). In part,
reconsideration takes place at a "conference" which is generally informal. The claimant is
entitled to a "formal conference" only when termination or suspension of benefits is
proposed. The availability of subpoena power in the "formal conference" procedure appears
to be the only feature distinguishing the two proceedings. Id. at 1054.
After reconsideration, a claimant who is still dissatisfied may request a hearing. Proce-
dures surrounding the hearing are flexible. The presiding officer, at his discretion, may hold
pre-hearing or post-hearing conferences to facilitate the hearing and decision. Id. at 5778.
The hearing officer may adjourn for new matter if he feels "relevant and material" evidence
is available but unpresented. Judicial rules of evidence are inapplicable at the hearing. Id.
The Appeals Council, upon its own motion or upon request, may review the hearing's
determination. Id.
In addition to initial determination, the administrators of SSI must redetermine eligibil-
ity at least once every 12 months. Id. at 1360.
2' There is virtually no reliable information on the extent to which claimants in any
social welfare program have assistance, apart from that given by a claims examiner, in
applying for benefits at levels of the adjudication process which do not involve a hearing of
any sort. It is likely that public assistance and Social Security claimants get some help from
various social work agencies. Veterans are assisted sometimes by post service officers in
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often uninformed of his rights,27 an adversary in any realistic
sense. In this context, the theoretical model of the passive ad-
judicator ruling on the basis of facts and arguments presented by
opposing parties is wholly inappropriate. Hence, agency policy and
practice recognize that claims adjudicators must assist in the de-
velopment of facts, as well as sit in judgment on evidence pre-
sented to them. HEW's Handbook of Public Welfare Assistance reflects
the position of most benefit-determining agencies:
Relying on the individual as a primary source of information
does not relieve the agency of the responsibility to recognize the
differing capacities of applicants and recipients to discharge their
veterans' organizations and longshoremen, harbor workers, and federal employees get some
assistance from union representatives. With the possible exception of veterans, however,
there is no reason to believe that a significant percentage of claimants have outside assistance
prior to an initial denial of their claims.
Some agencies do collect statistics on representation in appeals. The Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals in the Social Security Administration (SSA) reported that in May 1972, 34% of
the petitioners in SSA hearings were represented by attorneys-a 14% increase over May
1970-while another 12% of claimants were represented by nonattorneys. Seventy-seven
percent of claimants before the Board of Veterans' Appeals had representation. This
nonattorney representation is provided free by state and private veterans' organizations. The
Labor Department keeps no figures on representation, but it is widely believed that most
appellants in FECA cases are represented by the Association of Federal Government
Employees. It is believed also that many longshoremen have had attorney representation on
their compensation claims because of a possible action in unseaworthiness against third
parties, which action would require an attorney's assistance. By contrast, only about 10% of
public assistance claimants had representation at hearings during the period January-June
1972. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Fair Hearings in Public Assistance
January-June 1972, April 23, 1973, table 12 (NCSS Report E-8).
Because appealed cases make up a very small portion of the caseload, or even of the
denied claims, a very high rate of representation on appeal would not indicate substantial
access to attorneys or other representatives at critical times in the claims process. See notes
32-35 and accompanying text infra. Looking at selected statistics, however, one may wonder
whether representatives of the sort currently available to claimants do much good anyway.
For example, representation increases one's chance of success by only two percent before the
Board of Veterans' Appeals. And, a Social Security disability claimant seems to get as much
benefit from the Administrative Law Judge calling in a government expert as from having a
representative-a 13% increase in his chance of winning. Moreover, when both a representa-
tive and a medical advisor are present the claimant's chances of prevailing rise 26%, which
perhaps attests to the non-adversariness of the procedure. See generally U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process, Report No. 7, April 15,
1970. Indeed, a recent study of adverse actions in the Civil Service Administration found
that unrepresented claimants fared better before the Civil Service Commission than those
who were represented. See Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59
VA. L. REV. 196, 267-72 (1973).
217 See generally Handler & Hollingsworth, Reforming Welfare: The Constraints of the
Bureaucracy and the Clients, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1167, 1174-75 (1970); Mashaw, supra note 11,
at 818-28, 834; Scott, Reality of Due Process-A Study of the Implementation of Fair Hearing
Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 745-46 (1972); Comment,
Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TExAs L. REv. 223, 236-37 (1967).
MANAGEMENT SIDE OF DUE PROCESS
responsibilities to the agency. Some can provide or obtain
needed information after the agency explains what information
is needed; others will need specific directions to sources of
information; others may want, or have to rely on, the agency to
obtain the information for them.28
Even when the claimant is exercising appeal or de novo hearing
rights after an initial denial of his claim, programs involving the
payment of public funds employ a nonadversary procedure in
which the government is not specially represented and recognize
an obligation to aid the claimant in presenting his case.2 9
B. The Necessity for "Informality"
Adversary procedure regulated by procedural safeguards
could, of course, be made the principal guarantor of the accuracy
and fairness of social welfare adjudications. But the prospects for
successful monitoring and regulation of the claims process through
adversary procedure seem dim. The principal difficulty with such
an effort is that the availability of appeal hearings in which some
elements of trial-type procedure are available has an arguably
insignificant impact on the initial and most important decisions
28 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC WELFARE
ASSISTANCE, pt. IV, § 2400 (H.T. No. 139, Feb. 8, 1968). See also California Dep't of Human
Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1971) (describing unemployment insurance
claims system).
29 See note 25 supra. Compensation programs such as Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970), or Federal Employees' Compensation
(FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1970), use procedures which place greater reliance on
adversary development of the record. But again, adversary procedure is tempered by
responsiveness to the basic purpose of these programs-the provision of prompt aid to
covered employees-a purpose which the fault system and judicial due process had previ-
ously failed to serve adequately.
See Haynes v. Rediri A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1020 (1967); Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222-23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 914 (1957). See also Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932); Bernstein,
The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 992, 993-94
(1971). Indeed, the extent to which the beneficent purposes of the compensation scheme
are realized depends in large degree upon the extent to which the agency assists in the
development of the record and the settlement of claims prior to a contentious hearing.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 99-114 (1972). Thus,
in FECA cases, while compensation payments are charged against agency budgets, the
contested claim is very rare. M. Gilhooley, The Federal Employees' Compensation Act, Jan.
20, 1972, at 11 (staff report prepared for Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs of the
Administrative Conference of the United States). And in the Longshoremen's program,
potentially the most adversary of the federally funded or administered benefit or compensa-
tion programs, over 90% of the cases are disposed of prior to hearing. See M. Checchi, The
Longshoremen [sic] and Harbor Workers' Act, March 20, 1972, table 1 (staff report
prepared for the Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States).
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concerning eligibility. Moreover, as will be developed further
below, it is far from clear that formal adversary procedure is
appropriate at the hearing or appeal stage of social welfare claims
adjudications.
1. Hearings as a Means for Monitoring the Quality of Initial
Eligibility Determinations
A threshold problem in using adversary process to produce
high quality adjudication of social welfare claims is the necessity for
relying upon claimant appeals or requests for de novo review as
the mechanism for triggering the adversary process.30 Indeed,
there are really two types of problems here. First, in such a system
there will be no quality check through hearings when favorable
action is taken on the claimant's request because, unless the claim-
ant disagrees with the amount of the award, no appeal will be
taken.31
Even when the decision is negative, appeals leading to hear-
ings are highly and mysteriously selective. For example, in 1970
nearly one-half of the claims for Social Security disability payments
(excluding technical denials) were rejected. From this universe of
unsuccessful applicants, about eleven percent requested a
hearing. 32 The appeal rate in public assistance programs for the
first six months of 1971 was approximately two percent, and
fifty-four percent of those appeals were lodged in three states.33
30 Presumably, initial determinations of eligibility, ineligibility, and amount of payments
would continue to be made informally. There is no reason for an adversary proceeding until
a claim has been made and denied, just as there is no reason for a private lawsuit unless a
demand for payment or compensation has been rejected.
31 Of course, a procedure for government appeals by special reviewing officers could be
established to contest affirmative actions, but it would seem more sensible to simply let the
reviewer who thinks a decision is wrong reverse it.
32 Computations were done from the figures reported in Dixon, supra note 11, at 683
n.12.
" The two percent figure results from the ratio of appeals to all appealable decisions,
including positive actions which might be appealed on the basis of amount of payment.
When only denials and terminations are considered, the appeal rate rises to about six
percent. General assistance, Medicaid, and decisions based on the death of the claimant have
been excluded from the universe. Computations are based on the statistics reported in U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Fair Hearings in Public Assistance January-June
1971, May 22, 1972 (NCSS Report E-8); U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Reasons
for Disposition of Applications Other Than by Approval January-March 1971, Dec. 3, 1971
(NCSS Report A-10); Id., April-June 1971, Mar. 8, 1972; U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare, Reasons for Discontinuing Money Payments to Public Assistance Cases January-
March 1971, Dec. 15, 1971 (NCSS Report A- 11); U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare,
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We simply do not know enough about the self-selection pro-
cess to determine how these appeal rates ought to be interpreted.
The rates seem quite low, but do they reflect a high degree of
claimant satisfaction, a low error rate for initial determinations,
poor information about appeal rights, 34 inadequate notice of the
ground for decisions, or something else? Without such information
we certainly cannot conclude that the opportunity for appeal is an
effective check on the fairness and accuracy of even initial denials
of claims for benefits or compensation. But one conclusion may be
drawn: The initial level of adjudication is by far the most impor-
tant decisional level. That decision is final in well over ninety
percent of the social welfare claims filed.3 5
Appeals might effectively monitor quality if a limited stream of
appeals produced information about where the problems are in
initial adjudications and corrected those problems through the
force of precedent. But this possibility does not seem very plausi-
ble. One difficulty is that the process of hearing appeals does not
produce information on patterns of problems which may be
emerging at the initial levels of adjudication or on the timeliness of
initial claims processing. The appeal or hearing process involves
individual claims or claimants-not the quality of the claims pro-
cess as a whole. The appeals board or examiner does not launch an
investigation to determine whether he is dealing with an isolated
problem or the tip of an iceberg of similar but unappealed cases.
Nor do appeals really act as a supervisory check on initial
decision in most systems. Because facts relating to entitlement
constantly change and because the claimant would often be
seriously prejudiced if at a hearing he could rely only on evidence
originally presented to or developed by the claims examiner, an
"appeal" is often not an appeal on the record of the initial
Applications, Cases Approved and Cases Discontinued for Public Assistance January-March
1971, Nov. 30, 1971 (NCSS Report A-9); Id., April-June 1971, Mar. 22, 1972.
4 See note 27 supra.
The appeal rates in programs other than AFDC and the Social Security Disability
program also were very low. Figures for 1971 reveal 440 appeals from 20,000 FECA
decisions and 302 formal hearings after 6,000 informal conferences in the Longshoremen's
program. Underlying 20,000 appeals to the Board of Veterans Appeals were 325,000
informal decisions on new applications filed for veterans' pensions or compensation and over
two million total VA actions on new and continuing cases. M. Gilhooley, Summary of
Reports on Federal Disability Procedures, (memorandum prepared by staff of Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, March 31, 1972 for use at Airlie House Conference on
Comparative Study of Federal Disability Benefit Procedures, April 23-24, 1972) (on file at
the Cornell Law Review).
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determination. It is rather a de novo determination on an open
record which may be supplemented.3 6 Hence, a finding on appeal
which diverges from the initial determination on the claim is not
necessarily a finding of error. It is merely a different finding which
may have been made on quite different facts. Therefore, the rate
of "reversals" of initial decisions by -adjudicators who conduct
hearings is, standing alone, a statistic which tells us nothing about
the quality of initial decisions.
There also appear to be special problems with the
development and dissemination of precedent in social welfare
claims systems. Cost is clearly a major factor. Adjudicators in large
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children or
Social Security Disability Insurance process thousands of hearings
per month. This workload cannot be managed at an acceptable cost
if each adjudicator is expected to write a full narrative description
of his cases and his reasons for decision. Nor does it seem likely
that the benefits of "sanitizing" (eliminating all identifying
characteristics to ensure confidentiality of medical and other
personal information), printing, indexing, and circulating these
decisions would exceed the costs involved. Initial claims
adjudicators would not have time to read them as they came out.
Their relevance would therefore have to be discovered by the
examiner in the context of new claims, usually without the aid of a
represented or knowledgeable claimant. And he might discover
that there were hundreds, if not thousands, of potentially relevant
precedents.
Difficulties of this sort perhaps explain the widely divergent
practices of various social welfare systems with respect to the
precedential value of prior adjudications. HEW requires by
regulation that AFDC hearing decisions be synopsized, and made
available to the public by the states,3 7 but it does not enforce the
requirement, and the states do not comply.3 8 The Board of Ap-
peals and Review in the Civil Service Commission keeps a file of
36 All of the public benefit programs use an open file approach, and one should expect
that the facts might appear quite different at a hearing than they did upon initial applica-
tion. For one thing, having once been denied, a claimant may pursue appropriate evidence
of entitlement more seriously in preparation for a hearing. For another, time affects
eligibility in some situations: disabilities may become worse, for example, or public assistance
claimants may expend financial resources which previously made them ineligible.
37 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(19) (1973) (also applicable to Old Age Assistance and Medical
Assistance for the Aged, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and
Medicaid).
38 Scott, The Regulation and Administration of the Welfare Hearing Process-The Need for
Administrative Responsibility, I1 WM. & MARY L. REv. 291, 341-42 (1969).
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precedent decisions, but these are not available to the public
because they are not "sanitized. ' 39  The Social Security
Administration 40  and Labor Department41  issiie "sanitized"
precedent decisions in disability and Federal Employees'
Compensation (FECA) cases respectively, but these are a selected
group of decisions which, at least in the disability program,42 seem
to deal with peculiar legal issues rather than with the more usual
application of broad standards to complex facts. And the Veterans'
Administration (VA) simply refuses to give its appeals decisions any
precedential value.43
In short, administrative appeal or de novo hearing provides a
very unsystematic check on the quality of initial adjudications of
claims. The process of social welfare claims adjudication therefore
necessarily places heavy reliance upon the initial claims adjudicator
as a developer of facts, as a formulator of syntheses which subsume
facts under relevant standards, and as a counselor to both the
claimant and the unrepresented interests of the program he
administers. Accuracy, fairness, and timeliness depend largely
upon the competence and vigor with which the initial adjudicator
performs these functions, as well as the function of ultimate
decision.
2. Appeal Hearings and Adversary Process
To a limited degree the Supreme Court has recognized that a
fully adversary hearing may be inappropriate even at the hearing
stage of social welfare claims proceedings. In Social Security
disability hearings, for example, no one appears to represent the
agency. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) therefore has the
obligation to develop facts adverse to the claimant if he considers
such development necessary to a full and fair determination of the
merits. Similarly, the ALJ aids an unrepresented claimant in pre-
senting his case. And ultimately, he decides whether the claimant is
entitled to benefits. In short, the procedure is inquisitorial rather
than adversary, but the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected a
"9 M. Gilhooley, Civil Service Disability Procedures March 17, 1972, at 16 (staff report
prepared for Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs of the Administrative Conference
of the United States).
40 Dixon, supra note 11, at 709.
41 M. Gilhooley, supra note 29, at 15.
42 See Dixon, supra note 11, at 709 n.128.
43 38 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1973); see id. § 19.103; 38 U.S.C. § 4004(c) (1970) (VA regulations,
administrator's instructions, and precedent opinions of general counsel binding).
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combination-of-functions challenge to it in Richardson v. Perales.44
In a discussion marked by broad and somewhat impatient
language, and little analysis, the Court stated:
Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too
many procedures designed, and working well, for a
governmental structure of great and growing complexity. 45
The difficulty with "bringing down" the inquisitorial
procedure approved in Perales is not difficult to fathom. The only
logical replacement for one man wearing three hats is three men,
each wearing one: a neutral hearing officer, and separate
representatives for the claimant and the social welfare agency. A
hearing officer limited to deciding on the basis of facts presented
by others would have to be informed of the basis for the
government's denial of the claim by a representative of the relevant
social welfare agency. Given the educational level, cultural
background, economic and medical problems suffered by most
social welfare claimants, 46 and the complexity of some benefits
44 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
45 Id. at 410.
46 The groups in greatest need of social welfare programs, the nation's poor and
disabled, are less educated than the nation at large. Nearly 23% of families whose head had
eight or less years of formal education were poor in 1966, while only 7.5% of the families
whose head graduated from high school, and only 3.4% of the families whose head
graduated from college were poor. S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE
1970's, at 5 (1969). Moreover, blacks are more likely to be poor than whites. In 1970, less
than- 10% of the nation's white population was poor, compared to more than 32% of the
nation's blacks. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
329 (1972).
In 1971, more than 43% of the women heading AFDC families were black. U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education & Welfare, Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study: Part III, National Cross
Tabulations, April 1973, table 32 (NCSS Report AFDC-3). Of 81% of the AFDC women
family heads whose educational levels were known, over 25% had no more than an eighth
grade education, another 30.7% failed to graduate from high school, and only 3.2% had
attended college. Id. table 26.
A recent study indicated that the nation's disabled are generally older, poorer, non-
white, and uneducated. Allan & Cinsky, General Characteristics of the Disabled Population, 35
Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1972, at 24, The study found that 21% of the black population, but
only 11% of whites, were severely disabled, and that the median education level for the
disabled population is ten years, compared to 12 years for the nation at large. Id. Moreover,
42% of the disabled failed to attend school past the eighth grade; whereas only 22% of the
nation at large failed to attend school past the eighth grade. Id. at 25. Minority group
members are also more likely to be receiving Social Security Disability benefits-27 per 1,000
insured minority workers received such benefits compared to 19 per 1,000 insured white
workers. Goff, Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries Under OASDHI: Regional & State Patterns, 36 Soc.
SEC. BULL., Sept. 1973 at 3, 7.
In 1971, 1.4 million whites and 240,000 blacks received Social Security Disability
benefits. Soc. SEC. BULL., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPP., 1971 table 67. The percentage of
788
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determinations, separate representation of the agency would, in
the interest of fairness, virtually demand publicly provided
claimant representation.4 7  The costs of such an adversary
procedure probably render it unacceptable. No federal social
welfare system currently provides representation for claimants as a
matter of right,48 nor does it seem likely that a public program for
providing attorneys (or other types of representatives) for all social
welfare claimants at hearings could be instituted at a budget figure
low enough to make the program attractive to agencies,49
legislatures,5" or the courts.51
blacks beginning to receive Social Security Disability increased from 10.9% in 1957 to 14.7%
in 1966. Goff, Disabled Beneficiary Population 1957-66, 34 Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1971, at 32,
33.
Nearly 30% of the recipients of Aid to the Blind in 1970 were black, and only 25.2% of
Aid to the Blind recipients attended school beyond the eighth grade. U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, Findings of the 1970 AB Study Sept. 1972, at 5, 7 (NCSS Report
AB-1).
Recipients of Medicare and Social Security retirement benefits appear to be a more
representative cross section of the nation's population than recipients of the above cited
programs. In July 1970, nearly 90% of the Medicare recipients were white (West, Five Years
of Medicare-A Statistical Review, 34 SOC. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1971, at 17, 18. In 1971, 12.8
million whites and 1.0 million blacks received Social Security retirement benefits. Soc.
SEC. BULL, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SuPP., 1971 table 67.
For comparison with the above racial and educational figures, .approximately 11% of the
nation's population is black. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES table 31 (1973). Moreover, of the nation's population 25 years of age or
older, 23% attended at least some college, and an additional 35% graduated from high
school. Id. table 173.
47 See, e.g., JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, ISSUES IN WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION: WELFARE-AN ADMINISTRATIVE NIGHTMARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
[hereinafter cited as ISSuES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION]; Dixon, supra note 11, at 701-09.
48 See note 26 supra.
49 Prior to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), HEW issued regulations which
would have required the provision of representation in public assistance fair hearings as of
July 1, 1969 (33 Fed. Reg. 17,853 (1968); 34 Fed. Reg. 1354, 1356 (1969)), but the effective
date later was changed to July 1, 1970. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969). After the Goldberg
decision and prior to the regulation's effective date, the mandatory representation provision
was deleted from the final regulations. 35 Fed. Reg. 10,591 (1970); see 45 C.F.R. §
205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1973).
50 See Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1973, § A, at 9, col. 1. (outlining efforts of District of
Columbia's superior court judges to stretch their inadequate budget for representation of
indigent criminal defendants). Congress has authorized a limited use of government-
provided counsel under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 939 (Supp. II, 1972).
51 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970), recognized the usefulness, and
arguably even the necessity, of counsel at pretermination AFDC hearings, but refused to
require appointment of free counsel. Similarly, several district courts have noted that lack of
counsel has contributed to poor development of a claimant's disability case, but they have
remanded cases to the hearing examiner for better development rather than appoint
counsel. Crowder v. Gardner, 249 F. Supp. 678 (D.S.C. 1966); Ihnen v. Celebrezze, 223 F.
Supp. 157 (D.S.D. 1963); Hall v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 905 (M.D.N.C. 1963).
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Other disadvantages may also attend a fully adversary-type of
proceeding. It is unlikely, for example, that adversary proceedings
would accelerate the process of decision. Adversariness almost
necessarily has a strong association with formal procedure and with
a punctilious regard for procedural rights. Formality and
punctiliousness take time-time that can have harsh consequences
for the social welfare claimant who is awaiting a decision.
This is not to say that present nonadversary hearing
procedures are faultless or that adversary procedure would
produce no gains. It is only to suggest that before imposing formal
adversary procedures for the adjudication of social welfare claims
there should be no doubt that the benefits in accuracy and fairness
which might thereby be -achieved would outweigh the attendant
administrative costs to the public and delay to claimants. But there
is little evidence to substantiate the proposition that increased
formality or adversariness would improve social welfare
adjudications. No controlled experiments have been conducted;
the data on the effects of representation in claims adjudications is
highly ambiguous, 52 and there is some evidence from the AFDC
program that the implementation of formal procedures may be
resisted in systems which are already under stress and therefore
are suspected of making a large number of errors.53
C. Conclusions
Two conclusions would seem to follow from this discussion:
First, providing procedural safeguards or opportunities for appeal
may be of limited value in ensuring fairness, accuracy, and
timeliness in social welfare claims adjudications; and second,
because increased or continued reliance on formal adversary
procedure has limited value in this context, the assurance of
accuracy, fairness, and timeliness should be pursued by other
available means.
52 Regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a correlation between representation
and "success," (see note 26 supra) it seems impossible to show a cause-and-effect relationship
between representation and favorable decisions. Too many other variables are present. For
example, claimants having "strong" cases may see a greater possibility of recovery and, in an
effort to protect that possibility, obtain counsel. On the other hand, claimants having a lesser
chance of recovery may refrain from obtaining counsel because they want to avoid the
out-of-pocket expenses which would follow denial of their claims. Alternatively, it could be
argued that claimants with less substantial claims are more likely to obtain counsel on the
basis that claimants with supposedly stronger claims may expect to win without counsel. See
Dixon, supra note 11, at 720-22. As Dixon points out, there are several possible explanations
for "success" rates being dependent, to some extent, upon legal representation. Id. at 720,
n.185.
52 See note 98 and accompanying text infra.
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Numerous additional safeguards for claimants' interests may,
of course, be imagined. Fairness is sometimes thought to be pro-
moted by presumptions which skew the cases in the direction of
positive determinations and which, therefore, reallocate the burden
of proof so that lack of technical or financial resources will not bar
some otherwise valid claims. Accuracy might be promoted by better
training of personnel, by simpler or clearer substantive rules, or by
increased emphasis on developing evidence relating to relevant
facts.
Which of these techniques would most improve the quality of
claims adjudications in particular programs will not be determined
here. Instead, this Article will describe a comprehensive strategy
for managing the process of adjudication to assure a high-quality
adjudicative product. A decision to take specific corrective action is
the final step in such a quality assurance system.
II
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ADJUDICATION AS A
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE
A system for monitoring the performance of personnel and
the quality of end products is such an obvious necessity in any large
business enterprise that the failure to employ some method of
quality control would be considered desperately poor, if not irre-
sponsible, management. Moreover, a quality control system can be
adapted to virtually any type of enterprise or end product for it
involves merely the development of standards, the evaluation of
performance against those standards, and action to upgrade sub-
standard performance.
As straightforward and sensible as such a management device
might appear, quality control programs having all these attributes54
have been used in only two federally funded or administered social
welfare programs-the Social Security System (OASDI) and vete-
rans' benefits programs. The experience55 in these programs pro-
54 All the social welfare programs funded or administered by the federal government
do some monitoring of claims adjudication performance. This monitoring, however, ranges
from the very systematic, comprehensive and continuous programs in SSA and VA to
systems like that in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation program,
which merely involve being on the alert to review dispositions which appear peculiar because
of a large settlement or the withdrawal of a claim after hearing.
'5 This experience is reported on the basis of information contained in the quality
control manuals for these programs, the review of selected output of the quality control
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vides a basic model for a quality control or quality assurance
program and permits identification of the problems and limitations
inherent in quality control techniques.
A. Standards and Techniques for Evaluation
1. What is an Error?
Development of standards and methods for the evaluation of
accuracy, timeliness, and fairness in adjudication is not a simple
matter. Several extremely serious issues surround the question of
accuracy. It might be said that decisions are accurate if facts are
correctly found and an appropriate application of relevant pro-
gram policy is made to those facts. However, the correctness of
fact-finding and the appropriateness of policy application often
involve questions of judgment. For example, the apparently simple
determination of a claimant's age for purposes of Social Security
retirement benefits may, in the absence of official birth records,
involve the weighing of contradictory evidence from numerous
sources. An evaluation of the correctness of the adjudicator's
ultimate finding of fact with respect to age, therefore, will involve a
determination of the soundness of the adjudicator's judgment.
Such second-guessing is not very meaningful in terms of program
performance.
A slightly different problem concerning the determination of
accuracy involves the question of whether one is interested in
correct fact-finding on the record that was before the adjudicator
or in "correctness" in some more objective sense. To continue the
previous Social Security example, a finding that a claimant is of a
systems, and extensive interviews with the persons in charge of the quality control efforts in
SSA and VA.
The quality control procedures of the Veterans' Administration are described in
Department of Veterans Benefits, Evaluation System, July 1, 1969 (Manual M20-3). The
quality control system used in the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social Security
Administration is described, in part, in the following SSA publications and transmittals:
Social Security Administration, Specifications for End-of-Line Appraisal Process, Aug. 1968;
Social Security Administration, Disability Insurance Letter No. 11-37, March 1, 1972; Social
Security Administration, DOM Transmittal No. 180, May 31, 1972; Social Security Ad-
ministration, Evaluation and Measurement System, Report on Policies and Procedures for
Establishing Initial Entitlement to RSDI Benefits, Aug. 1972.
The author has discussed the scope and operation of the management techniques used
to assure quality adjudications with the person having overall responsibility for the claims
adjudication process and, if different, the person in charge of quality assurance activities for
the Veterans' Administration, Social Security Disability, federally supported public assistance,
FECA, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation, and Civil Service Disability
programs.
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particular age may appear correct given the evidence compiled
from family sources, but records from public school departments
might have contradicted that evidence had they been secured. A
review based on the record would classify the determination as
correct, whereas a review de novo could find an error.
The problem of second-guessing cannot be completely elimi-
nated, but there are strategies for dealing with it which ameliorate
its impact on the reliability of the evaluation system. One such
strategy is to refine the evaluation format so that it differentiates
between relatively clear errors and what might be termed 'judg-
ment deficiencies." A second is to attempt to force agreement
between the initial adjudicator and the evaluator on whether an
error has occurred. As explained below, the VA uses both
strategies.
The program of Veterans' Pensions and Compensation, the
largest of the federal disability programs, has only two administra-
tive decisional stages and no court review. At the initial level, the
important eligibility questions-the determination of the extent of
disability and the determination for compensation purposes of
whether a disability is "service connected"-are decided by a Rating
Board consisting of one doctor and two legal specialists sitting in
the VA regional office. Case development work is done for the
Rating Boards by other regional office personnel. Decisions are
made largely on the basis of documentary evidence, although
informal conferences between the claimant or his representative
and the Rating Board are available. In difficult cases, a VA doctor
makes an examination and submits a report to the Board.
Nonunanimous Rating Board decisions are referred to the regional
supervisor.
The claimant may appeal initial decisions to the independent
Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). When an appeal is filed, the
initial level decisionmakers review the file to prepare a statement of
the case (SOC) explaining the decision, and in the course of this
review may allow the claim. The statement of the case is sent to the
claimant, and if he fails to respond, the case is closed. Only
one-half of the cases in which initial appeals are filed become
formal appeals, largely because the appellant fails to respond to the
SOC. In cases formally appealed, BVA gives de novo consideration
and an opportunity for oral evidentiary hearings.
As the internal checks in this system suggest, a substantial
amount of judgment is exercised in determining such questions as
what percentage of vocational disability a claimant has suffered
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because of a particular disease or injury. And, of course, "service
connection" can raise questions equal in difficulty to those often
associated with "scope of employment" in workmen's compensation
systems. To a certain degree, these issues are simplified by the use
of standard formulae (e.g., loss of a limb equals x percent disabil-
ity) and by presumptions of coverage. Nevertheless, a considerable
potential for inaccurate adjudication of claims remains, and the VA
attempts to monitor program performance through the use of a
Statistical Quality Assurance System.
The System operates as follows: There is a daily first-line
review of the total work product of most adjudication units. A
random sample of all claims on which any action was taken by the
unit on a given day is reviewed for both procedural and substantive
error. The reviewer, who is attached to the regional office, corrects
any error found, whether it involves the particular action on a
claim taken that day (e.g., adding a new dependent to a veteran's
file) or any action taken previously which comes to his attention
(e.g., the initial determination that a veteran had been honorably
discharged and was therefore eligible for benefits). He also enters
the numbers and types of errors found into a monthly report to
the regional office. The report is then sent both to the national
Office of Appraisal and back to the regional office.
The Office of Appraisal monitors these monthly reports, look-
ing for trends. While the national office does not conduct a
separate statistical review of a region's monthly output, it does
review in depth the total operation of a regional station. As part of
this review, the national office conducts another random sampling
of the station's work product, looking for the same types of errors
that the station checked for each day. The findings in the station's
monthly quality control reports are then checked against the results
of the national office's own review. In this way the office in effect
reviews the station's statistical quality control (SQG) operations. If
the variation between results of the office sample review and the
findings expressed in the station's monthly report is statistically
significant, that fact becomes part of the national office's report on
the management performance of the regional station.
The portion of the first-line and national office reviews which
is relevant for present purposes is the qualitative review. Each case
which is selected for review is evaluated for: (1) substantive error
(errors leading to an incorrect result), (2) judgment deficiency
(errors in the development of a claim file and cases in which the
reviewer thinks a different result more tenable than the one
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reached), and (3) procedural discrepancies (errors which do not
affect basic entitlement). Each of these categories is broken down
on a standard form into a series of subheadings and specific
inquiries. For example, the quality reviewer may assign a substan-
tive error when he finds an underevaluation of disability resulting
in no or a decreased pension. However, when the situation is not
clear, a judgment deficiency may be assigned, which simply states
that the rating evaluation was questionable and may have resulted
in inappropriately denying or restricting benefits.
For purposes of identifying adjudication units which seem to
be having difficulty applying the rating schedule, the type of error
assigned is not very important. If a pattern of errors begins to
appear, the situation requires investigation. Moreover, the
reliability of these patterns as indicators of trouble spots, rather
than indicators of a reviewer's errors or eccentricities, is increased
by requiring that each file containing an error be returned to the
initial adjudicator. That person must then agree or disagree with
the finding of error. If there is disagreement, the question goes to
higher authority for resolution. Hence, although the problem of
second-guessing judgments is not eliminated, a quality assurance
system like the VA's has the capacity to identify variance from the
institutional judgment of the agency. And within a closed system,
uniformity and accuracy tend to merge.
A variation on this approach may also help to deal with the
possible divergence between record and objective reality. The
categories of errors available' for assignment by VA quality
reviewers under the rubric of judgment deficiency include such
things as failure to request a needed medical examination or
piecemeal development of the claims record. In short, the reviewer
is saying that for one or several reasons the case record has been so
inadequately developed that a substantive error may well have
occurred. This sort of evaluation can be done without a costly and
time-consuming de novo development of the case by the reviewer.
The agency should not be wholly content with this sort of
record review. An attempt should be made by the agency to
validate its claims policies and procedures by checking actual claims
adjudication performance against an external standard. This
approach is embodied in the Social Security Administration's
Evaluation and Measurement System. Each month 1,000 recently
completed adjudications are assigned to specially trained personnel
who redevelop the claims and seek out the best available evidence
on every issue involved in eligibility. These determinations are then
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compared with the initial rouine decisions to see if any significant
differences appear. If so, this is an indication that an investigation
should be made into means by which the record reality as
determined by the usual claims process might be made more
consonant with objective reality as determined by the much more
intensive redevelopment. For example, experience with problems
unearthed by reviews involving a complete redevelopment of cases
may suggest that the agency instructions to adjudicators be
amended to specify the kinds of development effort necessary in
identified types of cases. And, of course, these new procedures or
routines will then become the subject of record reviews which may
assign errors for poor case development should the instructions not
be heeded.
2. How Many "Inaccuracies" Are Too Many?
Standards for accuracy, such as "permissible errors per
hundred cases," are also difficult to develop. Ideally, every system
should establish minimum levels of adequate performance as well
as goals for optimum adjudicative performance. But how are they
to be set? Zero errors can be the target, but because that goal is
unrealistic in any large program it is of limited value as a
management tool. The VA uses a goal and a minimum acceptable
level of errors per 100 cases. For example, the goal in substantive
errors by Rating Boards is 1.5 per 100 cases while the minimum
acceptable level of performance is 4.0 per 100 cases. These
numbers are simply based on experience, that is, what the program
professionals believe well-trained adjudicators can produce within
acceptable resource and time constraints. A moving target such as
the mean or median number of errors per adjudication unit during
the previous reporting period can also be used to provide feedback
on how various districts, regions, or individuals stack up against the
system as a whole. This is the approach taken by the Social Security
Administration. Regardless of approach, the important point is
that supervisory personnel must have accurate information on
error rates and types of errors before they can identify problems
and take action to make improvements.
3. The Evaluation of Fairness
Fairness as a criterion of system performance involves many of
the same considerations as accuracy. If findings of fact are correct
and application of policy is appropriate, decisions should be fair.
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However, the shortcomings of accuracy evaluations as a means of
determining whether the claimant got precisely that to which he
was entitled have already been mentioned. When adjudications in a
particular program involve marginal cases or matters of judgment,
and when quality assurance evaluations are made solely on the
basis of record evidence, management evaluation and control of
accuracy are necessarily tenuous. Fairness in these contexts must be
appraised by an independent evaluation of the process elements of
adjudication. A supplementary check on fairness should be
directed at those adjudicatory procedures and routines which are
meant to place the relevant facts, policies, and arguments before
the adjudicator and to facilitate sound decisionmaking-things
such as case development effort, articulation of the bases for
decisions, adequate notification of actions to the claimant, and
explanation of opportunities for appeal.
The Bureau of Disability Insurance in the Social Security
Administration, for example, tends to stress case development in its
quality assurance evaluations. This is a highly realistic emphasis for
a program in which all-or-nothing judgments based on abstract
medical and vocational criteria proliferate. Case development is the
first aspect of quality reviewed, and a failure to find adequate
evidence for a decision in the file is treated as a substantive
deficiency. However, failure to send adequate notices to the
claimant is treated as a technical deficiency-that is, one which is
not likely to affect the outcome of the case. This is perhaps a
reflection of the general lack of reliance placed on claimant
initiative in assuring correct determinations. It also highlights the
special meaning of the ideal of fairness in the context of a social
welfare program. This program perceives fairness not as a perfect
opportunity to participate or to contest, but rather as an
opportunity to have one's claim decided on the basis of all the
relevant information.
4. Timeliness as a Quality Factor
Timeliness is obviously of great importance to most claimants
for public benefits or compensation. It is also highly susceptible to
mathematical expression, reporting, and standard setting. Pro-
grams which do not have sophisticated formal quality assurance
procedures will generally gather some information for budgetary
purposes on time spent in claims processing. The VA has a rather
highly developed set of timeliness standards for processing pension
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and compensation claims which are based on prior program
experience. For example, the standard for adjudicating (i.e., time
spent by personnel in the adjudication section) an initial disability
claim is 2.38 man-hours. There are also overall timeliness
standards for processing various end products. For initial disability
claims the guidelines are to process 50 percent within 60 days, 75
percent within 90 days, and 98 percent within six months.
Two problems related to timeliness evaluation bear
mentioning. The first is the potential for efficiency to be perceived
as of paramount importance if timeliness evaluations are used to
make judgments about individual adjudicators. The second is the
potential impact of timeliness evaluations on other adjudicative
goals, such as substantive quality or first-in-first-out processing of
claims. These problems are similar to those recently ventilated in
congressional hearings involving charges that Internal Revenue
Service agents were evaluated on the amount of deficiencies
collected from taxpayers. 56 The possibility of creating incentives
for speedy but otherwise poor quality adjudications is obvious.
However, this is a problem which can be dealt with by formulating
a sensible and sensitive personnel policy, by adopting an evaluation
system which reviews all the elements of adjudication quality,
accuracy, fairness, and speed, and by refining the statistical analysis
-of processing time so that it reveals "creaming" of easy cases to
meet timeliness goals.
B. Continuous Evaluation
1. Statistical Reporting Systems
Because effective management requires the ability to perceive
trends in adjudication performance and to relate quality data to
program changes and exogenous factors which influence program
performance, positive case load management implies a continuous
monitoring function. Occasional collection and evaluation of data
will not provide the representative sample of performance
necessary for effective action. Of course, the periods with respect
to which data should be collected (month, quarter, year, or
irregular interval) will depend upon the program, its resources,
5; Hearings on Taxpayer Assistance and Compliance Programs Before the Subcomm.
on the Department of the Treasury, U.S. Postal Service, and General Government Appro-
priations of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 34, 41-46, 423,
680-81 (1973). See Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1973, § A, at 3, col. 1; id., Apr. 10, 1974, § A, at
16, col. 7.
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and the type of information sought. Moreover, the monitoring
function cannot be performed effectively without relatively
detailed information. Information can be provided on a continuous
basis by the introduction of a statistical quality assurance reporting
system.
Statistical quality control, or statistical quality assurance, simply
refers to a regular program using statistical techniques, which may
include sampling, wherein data are compiled to yield an objective
measurement of quality. When properly employed, statistical
sampling improves a quality assurance program. Sampling reduces
the cost of continuously monitoring quality and tends to focus
attention on important concerns, e.g., the delineation of distinct
elements in the adjudication process and the contribution of each
element to high quality end products.57 The assembly of sample
data discloses patterns of errors and permits the agency to distin-
guish random and essentially uncontrollable errors from recurrent
errors of a similar type or made by a particular adjudication unit.
Obviously, the more detailed the data provided the more
useful it will be in pinpointing problems and suggesting reasons for
their existence. Hence, in setting forth a model quality assurance
system it is useful to mention briefly several types of information
that seem to be required on a continuing basis for effective quality
assurance.
a. Cases and Issues Adjudicated. Information should be available
which reflects differences in the types of cases and types of issues
adjudicated. "Type of case" refers to the program to which the
claim relates. The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA) in the
Social Security Administration, for example, processes retirement
and survivors' insurance cases, disability cases, and Medicare cases
and has processed "black lung" benefit claims. For BHA's statistical
data to reveal anything useful, classification by program is
required, however, agencies should go considerably farther in
devising useful case categories. Continuing this example, BHA
collects timeliness data which reveal whether the case was dismissed
for technical reasons, involved a claimant-initiated postponement,
was a "no-hearing" case, or was a case in which agency
development of missing facts prior to hearing was required. These
data indicate to the agency how timeliness information within a
general category of claims should be evaluated, because the agency
57 The purpose of statistical sampling is analysis and evaluation as a basis for process
improvement, a purpose which may be considered of secondary importance when an agency
reviews 100% of its initial decisions for correctness.
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knows something about the contribution to processing time of
dismissals, claimant postponement of hearings, the hearing itself,
and agency development of additional facts.
"Type of issue" refers .to the specific statutory or regulatory
criteria and the factual issues involved in determinations. For
example, the VA breaks down issues into two major categories-
rating of disability and payments authorization. Disability rating
may be subdivided into a determination of whether the disability is
service connected and a determination of the extent of disability
from the rating schedule. These issues may again be subdivided
into sub-issues which respond to the criteria for service connection
and the evaluation of the extent of disability. Obviously, a notation
that an error involves an incorrect application of the rating
schedule is considerably more meaningful for management
purposes than a simple notation that the case contains an error.
Information that the case was a "back case" or a "nervous disorder"
is even more useful in identifying the source of the problem. A
pattern of similar errors would suggest, for example, that there is
need for improvement in the schedule or in the instructions for its
use.
58
b. Responsible Individual Adjudicator. Information is needed
which identifies the management unit or when appropriate, the
responsible individual adjudicator, so that effective action may be
taken to reinforce success and to improve performance. Obviously,
corrective or reinforcing action cannot be taken unless the
supervisory staff knows where to direct its interest. Normally,
sampling will not produce reliable information on individuals;
hence it can be used only to evaluate units, such as regional or
district offices, which produce a large number of decisions.
However, most statistical quality assurance (SQA) evaluation
routines should also include the return of sample files for
redetermination when errors show up in the SQA review. There is
certainly value in having errors brought to the attention of
individual adjudicators when files are returned, therefore,
information concerning who made the erroneous decision should
be available. Moreover, at some levels of the claims process, e.g., at
the appeals board level, the review sample may include 100 percent
58 Detailed information can, of course, overwhelm administrators and impede rather
than aid management. One solution to this problem is to reduce detail as information is
reported up through the supervisory system. The immediate supervisor of an adjudication
unit in a district office needs, and can manage, much more detailed information than the
bureau or administration director in the central office.
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of the decisions. In this situation, compilation of individual
adjudicator performance is clearly reliable and appropriate.
c. Adjudicatory Procedures. The need for continuous
information on both the substantive accuracy of adjudications and
the adequacy of claims processing is apparent from prior dis-
cussion. Yet, the procedural elements of claims adjudica-
tion-procedural regularity and agency case development effort
-should be underlined as requiring special attention in an
adequate statistical quality assurance system. Obviously, both
procedural regularity and case development bear on the accuracy
and timeliness of substantive decision. Accurate, and hence (in one
sense) fair decisions may result despite inadequate case
development and irregular procedure; but such lapses certainly do
not promote the goal of substantive accuracy. Moreover, poor case
development and procedural irregularity may produce claims
records which support the accuracy of judgments which would be
considered inaccurate were the record more complete. As
previously noted, this appearance of accuracy may be reflected in a
quality assurance review based on the record. Thus, lapses in the
decision process may not only produce error, but also effectively
hide it.
d. Decisionmaking Functions of the Adjudicatory Staff
Information is also needed which enables separate evaluation of
particular functions in the decisionmaking process, e.g., issue
statement or evaluation of evidence in substantive decisionmaking.
Analysis in terms of functions is a means for making more specific
the evaluation of substantive decisionmaking, case development,
and procedural regularity. Each of these aspects of claims
adjudication can be broken down into the operations that should
be carried out by the adjudication staff. Under case development,
for example, the operations might be broken down into items such
as collecting medical records, obtaining vocational evidence,
scheduling necessary medical examinations, taking appropriate
follow-up action, and so on. The possibilities for further
classification are virtually endless and obviously require the
exercise of management judgment in determining what level of
detail in quality assurance information is worth the cost of
collecting it.
2. Special Studies
A well-designed statistical quality assurance system can provide
a continuous flow of information concerning the quality of
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adjudications. But the system cannot provide all the information
necessary for effective management of the adjudicatory process.
For one thing, the data collected by such sampling techniques must
often be assembled by computer. Hence, the information must be
limited to that which can easily be encoded. This is likely to
produce tabulations of the incidence of error but little information
on its causes. Hence, the SQA system often merely alerts the
agency to apparent problems which must be investigated further in
order to determine whether a problem is real and if so, what
should be done about it.
Moreover, the reliability of sample data decreases with the size
of the sample. For example, a sample that is drawn to generate
reliable information concerning a regional office may be unreliable
with respect to a particular adjudication unit within that region.
Similarly, statistical quality control data on state public assistance
determinations may be reliable for the state as a whole, but highly
unreliable as an indicator of performance in the individual welfare
offices which make the adjudications. Behind the error rate for the
state may lie some county offices which have nearly perfect
performance and others whose records are disastrous. Periodic
audits or field reviews which deal in depth with smaller
adjudication units must be used along with statistical quality control
procedures to provide adequate information for proper oversight
of the adjudicatory process.
The Social Security Administration's use of special studies to
validate its case development procedures and reveal errors which
are effectively hidden when reviewing only the case record has
already been described. A similar issue that should be of concern to
agencies is whether inaccuracies, unfairness, and tardiness are
randomly distributed among claimants. Although agencies accept a
responsibility for assisting in claims development, there is
nevertheless considerable reliance placed upon initiation and
development of claims by the claimant in all benefit and
compensation systems. One might wonder, therefore, about the
extent to which agency assistance in developing claims neutralizes
factors such as the claimant's educational level or access to
independent technical assistance. Are those who are less
well-endowed educationally and financially, or who are the objects
of social prejudice, at a disadvantage in the claims process? Because
the information necessary for statistical correlations which would
begin to answer these questions is not routinely collected in case
files, SQA reviews are not satisfactory vehicles for obtaining the
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answers. Nor could all of the requisite information be routinely
collected when processing cases without suggesting to claimants
that facts which are not relevant to the adjudication of claims are
indeed relevant. The only technique for analyzing this aspect of
adjudication quality is the special study.
C. The Use of Quality Assurance Information
There are two major requisites for a successful quality
assurance program. The first is that the collection of information
on the quality of adjudications not be subject to the control of the
adjudicators whose product is being evaluated. The second is that
the information be developed in such a way that it is useful to and
used by those in charge of improving adjudicative performance.
These considerations suggest that considerable care must be taken
to ensure the independence of the quality assurance staff without
pushing them into a detached position in the agency from which
they, and their evaluations, have little influence on policy.
Two principles may be of some use in dealing with this
structural problem. The first is that while measurements or data
collection must be handled through procedures which will assure
independence from those responsible for adjudication, the
development of policy concerning the collection of information
and the interpretation of results must be carried out in conjunction
with those who have the adjudicatory responsibility. A second is
that the evaluator should always report his findings at least to the
supervisory level above the level whose performance he is
evaluating, and make the information available to the evaluated
unit as well. Unless both of these principles are observed,
evaluation may be unsound or irrelevant, or, alternatively, sound
and relevant analysis may go unheeded.
The structure of the quality assurance program in the Bureau
of Disability Insurance (BDI) in the Social Security Administration
again provides an attractive model. Statistical quality assurance
reviewers in the Bureau are independent of the line adjudicative
staff and have no adjudicative responsibilities. Sampling is done in
a fashion which effectively camouflages the cases that will be drawn
for review. And questions of policy on what data is to be collected,
what standards are to be set for the various quality criteria, and
what action is to be taken on the basis of information revealed by
SQA reviews are committed to a Quality Assurance Council
composed of the representatives of the five major divisions in BDI,
including Quality Assurance. Validation of the Bureau's policies
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through the Evaluation and Measurement System is committed to a
separate staff in the Office of Research and Statistics which reports
directly to the Commissioner.
D. The Inherent Limitations of Due Process Through Quality Control
Although a range of devices might be employed to deal with
discovered defects in the adjudicatory process, the available
alternatives include both major policy change, and simply doing
nothing. Management programs designed to make the adjudication
of claims fairer, more accurate, and more expeditious ultimately
depend for their success upon the will of the agency to act.
Moreover, because quality control procedures are directed toward
systemic problems rather than the correction of individual errors,
the management side of due process can never wholly supplant the
need for the more traditional protection afforded by procedural
safeguards and appellate review.
Quality assurance programs may have two somewhat
contrasting impacts on the judicial evaluation- of more or less
traditional due process claims. First, a well-constructed quality
assurance program may lessen the judicial perception of the need
for increased formality in agency adjudication. Second, a focus on
the management side of due process could also convince reviewing
courts that the provision of formal procedural safeguards and
appeal rights is inadequate in some contexts unless bolstered by a
sound internal quality assurance program.
III
QUALITY CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Potential Effects of Good Management on the Requirements
of Due Process
The watershed cases on procedural due process in social
welfare claims adjudications are Goldberg v. Kelly59 and its
companion Wheeler v. Montgomery.60 In these cases the Supreme
Court required that opportunity for a hearing encompassing all the
traditional elements of a trial-type proceeding-specific notice,
opportunity to appear in person or through counsel and to argue
orally, opportunity to present oral testimony and to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, and a
:9 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
60 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
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written decision based exclusively on the hearing record-be
provided prior to the termination of certain public assistance
benefits. A number of factors seemed to influence the Court's
judgment that trial-type procedures were constitutionally required.
The most influential of these factors seemed to be the desperately
needy condition of persons wrongfully deprived of public
assistance 61 and the feeling that the possibilities for error 62 in
public assistance determinations were too great.
However, since the Goldberg-Wheeler watershed, it has become
increasingly difficult to determine the direction in which the
tributaries are running. Oddly enough, the Court has not applied
the principles enunciated in Goldberg to other types of social
welfare claims.
In Richardson v. Wright,63 for example, the claimant's Disability
Insurance benefits had been terminated without hearing on the
basis of wage postings which the Social Security Administration
took as evidence that the claimant had regained the capacity to
engage in substantial gainful activity. The district court found that
termination without any hearing was unconstitutional, but required
only that the recipient be given notice of the proposed action and
an opportunity to provide rebutting documentary evidence prior to
a decision to terminate.64 Both the claimant and the Secretary
appealed. Shortly before oral argument in the Supreme Court,
HEW promulgated new regulations which substantially complied
with the district court order.65 Consequently, the Court vacated the
district court judgment and ordered the Secretary to reprocess the
claims under the new regulations. In so doing, the Court com-
mented: "In the context of a comprehensive complex administra-
tive program, the administrative process must have a reasonable
opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise.
66
Similar reticence has marked the approach to a number of
cases involving the application of Goldberg to the termination of
unemployment benefits. In California Department of Human Resources
Development v. Java,6 7 the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction
requiring a pretermination hearing, but limited its ruling to statu-
tory grounds. Then, in a cryptic summary affirmance of Torres v.
61 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
62 Id. at 266.
63 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
64 Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1971).
65 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1539 (1973).
66 405 U.S. at 209.
V 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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New York State Department of Labor,6 8 the Court approved termina-
tion of unemployment benefits to a worker without a prior hearing.
Although the underlying facts might permit distinguishing the case
from Goldberg on the ground that there were no disputed issues of
fact to be determined at a hearing,69 the Court did not do so
explicitly. When faced with the unemployment compensation issue
most recently in Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 70 the
Court skirted the problem by remanding the case to the district
court for a determination of whether it had become moot.
Justice Brennan, dissenting at length in Richardson v. Wright,71
could find no ground upon which to avoid the application of
Goldberg to terminations of Social Security Disability claims; nor,
presumably, could the dissenters in Torres when considering un-
employment insurance, for they stated that the Court should have
accepted jurisdiction and reversed the district court on the basis of
Goldberg. Apparently, the majority could find a distinction, al-
though the decisions themselves give no hint of what the distinction
might be, beyond the general reticence expressed in Wright about
constitutionalizing the procedure of complex administrative pro-
grams.
However, a major factor which may have been at work in
Goldberg, but was probably lacking in Wright and Torres, was a
judicial suspicion that the administrative system for determining
claims was not trustworthy. Prior to Goldberg the Court had seen
several public assistance cases which hardly inspired confidence in
state administration of AFDC.72 And there was ample indication in
the legal literature of the error proneness, not to mention the
arbitrariness, of public assistance determinations.7 3 On the other
hand, the Court, in its previous exposure to the Social Security
Disability claims process, had given a substantial vote of confidence
to the administrative system by noting that the "vast workings" of
68 405 U.S. 949 (1972).
69 See, Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 944-45 (1974).
70 409 U.S. 540 (1973). The Court's apparent desire to restrict the reach of Goldberg has
not been overlooked by the lower courts. See, e.g., Crow v. California Dep't of Human
Resources, 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972).
71 405 U.S. at 212-27.
72 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968). These cases were adverted to by the Court in Goldberg. 397 U.S. at 256 n.1.
73 Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37 FORDHAM L.
REV. 604, 610-11 (1969) (mentioned in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 n.12). A considerable
amount of additional secondary authority was available on these points. See, e.g., Handler,
Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1966); Note,
Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in
Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1307 (1967).
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the Social Security system tended to create impartiality and lent
circumstantial probity to its findings.7 4 And in Java, the Court had
been exposed both to statistics 75 suggesting that the unemployment
insurance scheme was weighted toward finding for the claimant
and to a process for claims determinations which seemed strongly
supportive of the claimant's interests.76
The Court also may have perceived differences between the
neediness of the AFDC and OAA client population and that of
persons served by unemployment insurance and disability insur-
ance. But nevertheless, a major reason for the contrast between the
Court's felt need to participate actively in the development of the
hearing process in public assistance and its reticence in other areas
may well be its confidence or lack of confidence in the integrity of
the underlying administrative process.7 7 Hence, it does not seem
unreasonable to suggest that proof of the existence or nonexistence
of a sound quality control mechanism should be influential when a
court is called upon to balance claimant need for the protections of
trial-type hearings against the costs of imposing adversary process
at a particular stage of a social welfare claims process. The availabil-
ity of the alternative protection of good management, which
should, of course, show up in the error rate identified by the
quality control mechanism, both lessens the need for the protec-
tions afforded by a hearing and tends to substantiate the adminis-
trative claim that the use of adversary process is an unnecessary,
and a potentially costly and time-consuming addition to a process
which is already carefully structured to implement a positive pro-
gram for the protection of the claimants' substantive economic
interests.
Of course, to the extent that the reliability of the social welfare
claims process is or becomes a factor in constitutional decisionmak-
ing, one would hope that the Court would explicitly identify it as
7" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
75 According to the statistics made available in Java, two-thirds of the initial claims for
unemployment insurance are granted. 402 U.S. at 128 n.4. Employers who challenge grants
are successful 50% of the time whereas claimant-appellants win only one-third of their
appeals. 402 U.S. at 129 n.7.
76 402 U.S. at 126-27.
77 In another context, Judge Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, has described a reviewing court's function as encompassing a determina-
tion of whether the totality of agency practice, policy, and procedure is consonant with
"basic requirements of the Rule of Law." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970). As a part of that review, Judge Leventhal envisions a judicial
alertness to a "combination of danger signals" which may bear on the integrity of the agency
decision process. Id. at 851. That all judicial review of agency decisionmaking is informed by
similar, but largely unarticulated premises seems highly likely.
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such and would analyze the management system and its adjudica-
tory product with some care. As the previous discussion has indi-
cated, quality control systems have a number of problematic as-
pects. The manner in which a particular management system deals
with those problems-both in its paper or manual description and
operationally-can easily make the difference between substantial
assurance of accuracy and fairness and a facade of statistical and
administrative routines which justifies little confidence in the regu-
larity of determinations. Yet, there seems to be no reason to ignore
the impact of a program's internal management system on the
quality of the claims process because of difficulties with judicial
evaluation of procedures outside a court's customary domain. The
judiciary is forced to deal with much that is complex and technical,
and within the context of the evaluation of a particular program a
firm basis for determining the adequacy of agency attempts at
quality assurance may emerge.
For example, a serious look in Goldberg and Wheeler at the
quality control program in AFDC or OAA should not have con-
vinced the Court that HEW's prescribed quality control program
provided strong circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of
the public assistance claims process. The quality control system
employed by the Assistance Payments Administration (APA) in
HEW for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (and formerly
OAA) has several features which distinguish it from systems in the
larger federally administered programs like Veterans' Pensions and
Compensation or Social Security. The basic difference is that the
principal interest in quality control in public assistance is not the
assurance of accuracy, fairness, and timeliness in all adjudications,
but rather the protection of the federal treasury from incorrect
state-authorized payments. This interest is not insignificant or
improper, but it results in both a methodology and a focus in
quality control reviews which fail to yield significant protections for
claimants.
The major failing of the system is its emphasis on positive
errors, that is, payments to ineligibles and overpayments to eligible
recipients. Under applicable regulations,78 only positive errors
must be reported to HEW; only positive errors need be included in
a state's schedule for reducing the incidence of error; and the
sanction of withholding matching funds is made applicable only to
excessive positive errors. This is not to say that negative errors are
78 45 G.F.R. §§ 205.40, .41 (1973).
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not monitored-they are required to be included in an approvable
state quality control plan79 and are in fact reported to HEW,
although less frequently than positive errors. But the omission of
statistics on improper denials in the most recent release of semi-
annual data from the national compilation of state quality control
(QC) reports" .s again suggestive of HEW's limited interest in the
negative error rate.
The policy of focusing on positive errors is justified by the
argument that appeals are designed to take care of improper
negative determinations. And the Secretary has stated that correc-
tive action by the states directed toward overpayments will also aid
in eliminating errors which result in underpayments. 8 1 These posi-
tions are untenable. Appeals in the AFDC program (the only
money payments program which is currently state-administered
with federal grant-in-aid funds) are, as will be discussed shortly,8 2 a
very imperfect safeguard against error. And the notion that at least
some of the more obvious means for guarding against overpay-
ments, e.g., requiring more detailed proof by claimants of their
income and resources, will also reduce underpayments is simply
ludicrous.
In short, the current QC system for AFDC is almost certain to
have serious skewing effects. Because there is an interest in, and
sanctions for, positive errors, such errors are the ones that adminis-
trators and claims personnel will seek to avoid. That negative
errors will thereby be increased seems unavoidable. Additionally,
and strangely, given the statutory requirement of promptness,83
the QC reviews do not look at the timeliness of claims actions. An
emphasis on avoiding positive errors without a similar interest in
timeliness will almost certainly slow down claims processing for
persons who by definition are dependent and needy.
There are also serious gaps in the Assistance Payments
Administration's quality control system. Sample sizes are sufficient
to provide reasonably reliable statewide or nationwide data on the
incidence of errors, but that data does not provide a basis for
evaluating the performance of individual welfare offices.8 4 Nor is
'9 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, QUALITY CONTROL IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE (QC MANUAL) V-I (1972) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
'0 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, HEW News, Dec. 20, 1973 (press release,
on file at the Cornell Law Review).
81 Id.
82 See text accompanying notes 89-108 infra.
13 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973).
84 MANUAL at VI-1 to -5, app. A. The largest sample size for a state is 800 actions, but a
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this failure remedied by requirements for audits or record keeping
at the state level which would reveal whether particular offices were
substandard.8 5 Another deficiency is the failure to institute a seri-
ous program of special studies to validate the information-
gathering techniques used in the program or to determine the
types of case development and evidentiary principles which would
prevent errors.8 6 And finally, the quality control program has not
been applied to hearings. As a consequence, there is very little
systematic data on how the hearing process is functioning.
B. Quality Control as a Judicial Remedy to Ensure Due Process of Social
Welfare Law: Emphasis on AFDC
If, as seems sensible, the underlying integrity of the social
welfare claims process should have a bearing on the need for
trial-type hearings as a means for assuring "fundamental fairness"
to claimants, it seems equally sensible to suggest that the realistic
prospects that such hearings or appeals will protect claimants
should also affect the appreciation of what due process requires in
the context of social welfare programs. Goldberg v. Kelly made much
of the critical situation of the claimants and emphasized the need to
tailor the hearing process to their capacities.8 7 The logical and
limited extension of that principle is that when due process cannot
be assured by trial-type hearings, additional or different techniques
for assuring fairness become appropriate. Therefore, if hearings
cannot provide reasonable assurance of accurate adjudication of
claims in a social welfare program-and in AFDC there is substan-
tial reason to believe that they cannot-then there should be
judicial imposition of a comprehensive quality assurance program
state may operate through several hundred individual city and county offices. On the
general problem of variations in approach among local welfare offices, see Mashaw, supra
note 11.
8s The only requirements for states are those set out in 45 C.F.R. § 205.120 (1973). This
regulation merely requires that the state make "regular visits" to local offices and use
reports, controls, or other necessary methods. And HEW's audits and other reviews are
notoriously ineffective. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH FEDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE (1964); M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS (1970); Tomlinson &
Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for
Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 621-29 (1972).
86 Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 85, at 623-24. The quality control procedures for
active cases involve full field investigations, and the reasons for errors are set down in coded
form. Thus, some information leading to validation of the eligibility determination process
can be gleaned from the QC process itself. However, negative cases do not have a field
review unless, for unstated reasons, the reviewer feels it necessary. MANUAL 111-4 to -10.
87 397 U.S. at 264.
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to bolster that program's capacity for high quality adjudicative
performance.
1. The Limited Value of Trial-Type Hearings to AFDC Claimants
There is very little systematic and reliable information on the
value of trial-type hearings to AFDC claimants. However, the value
of hearings in this program must be discounted at least by the
general considerations previously rehearsed which make appeals a
limited check on the fairness and accuracy of social welfare claims
adjudications. The information which is available on the AFDC
program should substantially decrease our confidence that the
procedural rights afforded recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly provide
substantial assurance of fairness and accuracy.
The first bit of troubling evidence has been mentioned previ-
ously: The appeal rate is very low. 8 8 Indeed, if one subtracts the
aberrational number of appeals in a few states89 from the statistics,
the number of appeals in AFDC is negligible. There is always the
difficulty of determining how many appeals represent an appro-
priate number in relation to any series of initial adjudications. But
in a program which is reasonably well-known for its error rate,
which has a very complex set of standards to apply, and which
involves decisions of great importance to its claimants, a negligible
appeal rate is troubling. It suggests that there are disincentives to
appeal in the system which limit the value of an opportunity for
hearing.
One deterrent to appeal may be the combined characteristics
of the claimant population and the program itself. Claimant educa-
tional levels are low, 90 and the eligibility requirements and grant
computations involved are quite complex.91 Although general in-
formation about AFDC may be widespread, specific knowledge
which would suggest a challenge to bureaucratic judgments is not
widely held. Moreover, to the extent that potential appellants
would complain merely of underpayments, there are significant
disincentives to making a request for a hearing. When adminis-
trators make continual, highly discretionary decisions about one's
basic necessities, e.g., whether to grant funds for a new mattress, a
s See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
89 For the period January-June 1972, for example, California, New York, and Texas
accounted for 44,000 of a total of 68,000 appeals. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare, Fair Hearings in Public Assistance, January-June 1972, April 23, 1973, table 5,
(NCSS Report E-8).
'0 See note 46 supra.
91 See IsSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 1-2.
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:772
telephone, or an additional heating allowance, it is not sensible to
take an adversary posture unless the issue is very important and
the prospects for success very high.92 Nor is it realistic to view a
claimant who may be chronically dependent as prepared to fight
city hall even when basic entitlement to benefits is at issue.93
A related consideration which bears on the value of an oppor-
tunity for hearing is the degree to which administrators are able to
construct a hearing system which will stimulate legitimate appeals
and have them effectively pursued by the claimant.94 For example,
a seemingly simple function, such as giving adequate notice, is
quite complex to administer. A careful oral explanation with an
opportunity for questions by the claimant might be the most
effective system. But tracking down claimants and providing such
notice would be time-consuming and very expensive in a program
which requires a pretermination hearing. 95 Moreover, the pos-
sibilities for misunderstanding also argue in favor of written notice
even if oral notice is also provided.
But what sort of written notice should be provided if we
recognize as a starting point that notice of termination or reduction
may be such an overpowering event for the recipient that his
response is unpredictable? 96 Indeed, even without the complicating
92 Handler, supra note 73, at 494-99; Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 27, at
1172-79.
93 See Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 326, 342
(1966).
94 See Comment, supra note 27, at 247-53.
95 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court mentions with approval a New York system of written
notice plus an oral conference. 397 U.S. at 268. However, the Court there referred to a
provision in the New York City manual for caseworkers which instructed them to discuss
doubts about eligibility with the client prior to recommending that a case be closed. State law
did not require this conference (see Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)) and it was not designed to explain a proposed action or to discuss appeal rights.
Moreover, the provision applied only if the caseworker was in doubt about the facts.
HEW regulations now provide that to be adequate, notice must be in writing (45 C.F.R.
§ 205.10(4)(i)(B) (1973)), and although some states may advise the client in the written notice
that he may request an agency conference to explain the proposed action, the time within
which to file an appeal which will stay the proposed action until after the hearing begins to
run from the date of written notice. See, e.g., 2 Virginia Manual of Policy and Procedure
§ 802A (Supp. 1972).
An additional method of dealing with the notice problem would be to provide represen-
tation to all claimants and to rely on the representative to explain the action and its grounds,
the client's right to a hearing, and the prospects for success. But this system would certainly
be as costly as oral notice, and it would also require the assignment of representatives to
clients prior to notification of a proposed action. Otherwise, there would be no guarantee
that the claimant would contact a representative for an explanation.
96 That this factor may be the major problem in giving notice of a right to hearing was
suggested to the author by Mitchell I. Ginsburg, Dean of the Columbia University School of
Social Work and former Commissioner of Social Services for the City of New York.
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factor that a notification deals with a claimant's basic sustenance, we
have no firm basis for predicting the effects of the specificity of
notice on recipient response. Concise notice designed to satisfy
minimum legal requirements may be too uninformative to stimu-
late questions by some, but it may galvanize others into seeking an
oral explanation which fully informs them of the agency's position.
Detailed statements of proposed actions, their reasons and support-
ing data may provide a solid basis for judgment about whether to
appeal, or it may seem to indicate a final agency position which
would make any appeal superfluous.
Arguably, these difficulties with the notice aspects of hearings
are overdrawn, and to a degree, that is conceded. But the other
elements of the hearing process are quite capable of posing similar
conundrums. How, for example, can one be certain that the
claimant understands what is to transpire at a hearing: what
evidence is relevant to the issues in contention, what information in
the agency's possession is the most critical or important for an
eventual decision, or even that the decision will be made wholly
independently of the prior decision of the caseworker? Agreement
that any or all of these possibilities for misapprehension may exist
is enough to support the limited argument made here that develop-
ing a hearing system which would give assurante that disappointed
claimants had experienced fair and accurate determinations of
their claims is quite a subtle and expensive business.
Additionally, the agencies which administer AFDC have not by
and large demonstrated great progress in the development of
workable basic hearing systems, much less systems which are tail-
ored to the needs of claimants in subtle or sophisticated ways. Prior
to Goldberg, state hearing regulations were not in substantial com-
pliance with even the basic requirements of the HEW regulations
on fair hearings.97 And the only systematic study that seems to
have been made of the compliance of agency practice with post-
Goldberg fair hearing regulations found that the New York City
public welfare agencies failed to provide a procedurally regular
hearing in a significant number of cases. 98 Based on a random
sample of appeals filed in October 1972, the New York evaluation
found, among many other defects, the following conditions which
are directly relevant to Goldberg's constitutional requirements: (1) 5
percent of the appellants had received no notice of a proposed
9' See generally Scott, supra note 38, at 301-52.
98 D. Kirchheimer, Community Evaluation of Fair Hearing Procedures Available to
Public Assistance Recipients, May 1973, at 5, 6 (on file at New York City Human Resources
Administration).
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adverse action; (2) 25 percent did not receive timely notice; (3)
two-thirds of all notices failed to give an adequate statement of
what action was proposed and what the factual and policy bases for
the action were; (4) in 15 percent of the cases aid had not been
continued as required pending appeal; (5) only 25 percent of the
appellants who requested access to relevant agency files prior to
appeal were given such access; and (6) in only 7 percent of the
cases was an opportunity for cross-examination afforded by having
opposing witnesses present. 99
These conditions are not really surprising. The same
overworked and undertrained welfare staff which handles initial or
continuing eligibility determinations also must issue notices, handle
requests for appeal, and assemble documents and witnesses. If the
program is in general an "administrative nightmare,"'0 the
hearing process will partake of that quality. Of course, New York
may be a special case. But there is also evidence of a fairly serious
breakdown in the hearing process in other states.' 0 ' Moreover,
there is reason to believe that few public welfare staffs are likely to
consider hearings important items in their workload,' 0 2 and that
failure is likely to color the quality of their efforts toward making
hearings available and meaningful to recipients.'0 3 There are also
at least some instances in which a breakdown in the hearing process
partakes of a more widespread pattern of official lawlessness in
welfare administration.' 04
The apparent antipathy of state agencies for the fair hearing
process and the unwillingness of HEW to actively support the
99 Id. at 9-26.
100 ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION pt. I, at 2.
101 The California hearing system has been criticized in a congressional study. See
Sitkin, Welfare Law: Narrowing the Gap Between Congressional Policy and Local Practice, in ISSUES
IN WELFARE ADMINxSTRATION Pt. II, at 36, 38-51. The Supreme Court has summarily
affirmed a district court injunction prohibiting California's use of the fact-policy distinction
set forth in Goldberg as a basis for distinguishing between cases which must and those which
need not have a pretermination hearing because of the state's inability to apply the
distinction properly. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub noam.
Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
Litigation asserting and often proving improprieties in the hearing process has involved
other states as well. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Swank, 337 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. I11. 1971) (failure to
comply with 60-day hearing rule); Banner v. Smolenski, 315 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1970).
See also Pevar, supra note 11, at 69-74; Scott, supra note 38, at 351, 357-63.
102 See Scott, supra note 11, at 743-44. Although Scott's study design is unscientific and
his conclusions ambivalent, it seems reasonable a priori to believe that caseworkers would
take the sensible attitude that most of their other functions are more important than cutting
square corners with respect to hearings or putting extra effort into their preparation.
103 Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient. Fair Hearings in AFDC-The Wisconsin
Experience, 43 Soc. SERV. REv. 12 (1969).
194 Mashaw, supra note 11, at 830-37.
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hearing requirement further weakens the value of hearings. An
interesting example of these attitudes is the state reaction to HEW's
proposals in December 1972105 to withhold payments from states
based on the rate of overpayments and payments to ineligibles
discovered in state caseloads. The states immediately responded by
charging that certain HEW policies, including the fair hearing
requirements, contributed to the erroneous payments. And in the
course of negotiations, 10 6 HEW agreed to amend the fair hearing
requirements in ways which reduce the likelihood of the
development of a uniform, 10 7 high quality hearing process and
which possibly violate Goldberg's pretermination hearing
requirement. 0 8 This is a decidedly peculiar response since fair
hearings have no discernible relationship to the overpayment and
ineligibility problems that called forth the initial HEW proposal.
To summarize, hearings protect claimants against unfair and
inaccurate decisions only on the assumptions: (1) that the claimant
is aggressive, knowledgeable about the program, and skillful in
developing and presenting facts (or has access to those who are),
and (2) that the hearing system works. Neither of these
assumptions has proven to be realistic with respect to AFDC
hearings, and there are reasons to have grave doubts about both. If
these doubts have substance, due process requirements which seek
to provide fair opportunities for claimant-initiated challenges to
agency determinations are focusing on only a small part of the
problem. As Goldberg recognized, the process which is due in social
welfare determinations should be that process which responds to
the supportive purposes of the program involved when viewed in
the light of realistic assumptions about its dependent clients. But,
the difficulties of providing meaningful hearings may be much
more significant than the Court was called upon to recognize in
Goldberg. The question is not so much when recipients can best
avail themselves of a hearing, as it is whether the adversary hearing
is such a chimerical protection in the AFDC context that due
process requires more.
2. Judicial Imposition of Management-Oriented Remedies
Due process should require greater protection for the
claimant, and such protection should include the application of
105 37 Fed. Reg. 25,853 (1972).
106 For a discussion of background, see NLSP Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law,
Comments on Proposed Regulations Re: Methods of Determining Eligibility, Fair Hearings
and Recoupment of Overpayments, May 1973, at viii-xiii.
107 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(1)(ii) (1973).
108 Id. §§ 205.10(4)(ii)(A)-(H).
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systematic management techniques which will discover errors,
identify their causes and implement corrective action. This is
suggested, not only by the inadequacies of the hearing process, but
also by the protective purposes of AFDC and other social welfare
programs. There is, indeed, a sense in which the imposition of a
basic quality control program as a part of due process might be
viewed as a lesser constraint on legislative and executive judgments
concerning the administration of these programs than is the
imposition of judicially delineated hearing requirements. The
former remedy is at least consonant with the avowedly paternalistic
objectives of the program, suggests solutions that are managerial
rather then legalistic, and avoids adversary postures that are
generally considered inappropriate by program professionals.
Nevertheless, there is certain to be reluctance on the part of
the judiciary to instruct administrators in the management of their
program. In part this reluctance will result from the novelty of
thinking about due process in terms of the management functions
which are relevant to adjudication. Moreover, one may suspect that
it is the "expertise" of judges in dealing with adversary proceedings
which undergirds their willingness to impose adversary hearings on
administrators who must be presumed to have thought those
procedures less than worthwhile. Judicial feelings of expertise born
of familiarity will not support the imposition of quality control.
Finally there will be reluctance to find that affirmative action of a
rather complex sort is required of administrators, because
affirmative orders require monitoring and imply a continued
judicial role in overseeing program operations.
Strong facts and good advocacy have leaped higher hurdles,
however, and there is already some precedent for a more active
judicial role in assuring that the promises made in Goldberg are not
broken through administrative mismanagement of the hearing
process. In Yee-Litt v. Richardson,10 9 for example, the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed an injunction which prohibited the State
of California from distinguishing between cases raising issues of
fact and those raising only issues of policy when deciding which
cases required a pretermination hearing. Although Goldberg did not
include policy disputes in its requirement of pretermination
hearings, 110 the district court found that California's administration
109 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub nor. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924
(1973).
110 The Court left aside the question of whether oral as well as written submissions
might be required as a matter of due process when policy issues were concerned. See 397
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of its facially valid regulations, which denied pretermination
hearings on policy issues, resulted in denials of hearings to persons
who, under Goldberg, should have received them."' The decision
contained somewhat contradictory findings concerning whether the
problem lay in state administration or in the inherent difficulty of
making the fact-policy distinction." 2 But the court, on the basis of
statistical reports submitted to it, clearly held that a failure to
obtain consistently accurate results in making the distinction
justified enjoining its use when the effect of its operation was to
deny due process to some claimants. 113
Yee-Litt suggests that at some point a court will be willing to
examine questions of whether poor practices or management are a
serious impediment to the realization of constitutional rights and to
take action which limits administrative discretion about the
effectiveness of program policies. Although the judicial response in
Yee-Litt merely reinforced the traditional requirement of trial-type
hearings, courts have been more management-oriented when
reviewing the performance of welfare program functions other
than fair hearings. Judicial orders have, for example, required the
development of affirmative action plans or procedures to deal with
the loss or theft of welfare checks, 1 4 to advise clients of their rights
under the NOLEO provisions,"15 to eliminate sexual discrimination
in the Work Incentive program (WIN), 1 6 and to prevent delayed
delivery of welfare checks." 7
Considering the recent history surrounding constitutional ad-
judication, such remedial developments in welfare cases certainly
are not surprising. Remedial innovation has been the order of the
day in areas such as racial discrimination," 8  reapportion-
U.S. at 268 n.15. But there can be little doubt that other aspects of an adversary proceeding
would not be required in the case of a pure policy dispute. See Merriweather v. Burson, 325 F.
Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd in part, 439 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1971).
111 353 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
112 Id. at 999-1001.
113 Id. at 1001.
114 Santana v. Sugarman, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
I's Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Notice to Law Enforcement
Officers (NOLEO), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(11) (1970), requires, as a condition to AFDC
eligibility, that claimants divulge to the state welfare department the name of the deserting
father, so that he can be located by law enforcement officials.
116 Thorn v. Richardson, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 113 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
117 Adens v. Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
116 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (recognizing that "a district
courts equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable remedies"; district courts have power to order busing); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (district court "may, if necessary to prevent
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ment,119 and constitutional criminal procedure. 20 In those areas,
attempts at broad formulation of principles have consistently failed
to effect the desired remedial ends, and the courts have therefore
become ever more closely involved in policy choice, approval of
administrative programs and the specification of required mana-
gerial or executive operations.
Recently, federal courts have become involved in litigation
resulting from what might be called the prisoners' rights
movement. 12 1 In the process of adjudicating claims of violations of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments, the courts have been
exposed to the detailed working of prisons, youth correction
centers and even homes for the mentally retarded. 22 Moreover,
having once found custodial care in these institutions to be
inadequate or improper under the Constitution's broad
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment or the denial of
due process and equal protection, the district courts have issued
orders of remarkable scope and specificity.
12 3
In Jones v. Wittenberg,'14  for example, the district court
further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to
levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimi-
nation a public school system"); Johnson v. Capital City Lodge No. 74, 477 F.2d 601, 603
(4th Cir. 1973) (remedying racial discrimination in a police benevolent society); Erie Human
Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 357 F. Supp. 422 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (remedying prior racial
discrimination in police hiring); Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 641 (D.D.C. 1972)
(ordering HEW to commence its statutory enforcement duties against insufficiently desegre-
gated higher education systems).
119 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (sustaining district court order
reapportioning both houses of Alabama legislature as "an appropriate and well-considered
exercise of judicial power"). But see Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187,
199 (1972) (holding that district court exceeded its powers in reapportioning state legislature
by reducing number of legislative seats 25%-40%; "the remedial powers of an equity court
must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited").
120 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (requiring warning before
in-custody interrogation "to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the
privilege [against self-incrimination] at that point in time"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (extending exclusionary evidence rule to evidence illegally seized by state officers for
use in state proceedings). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (implying right to damages against federal officers for violation of fourth amend-
ment).
12 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus action arising in
context of conditional-release program); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971)
(habeas corpus action arising under civil rights acts); Houghton v. Schafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968) (civil rights action by prisoner whose legal materials were confiscated).
12 See generally Comment, Beyond Attica: Prison Reform in New York State 1971-1973, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 924 (1973).
122 See generally Note, Equitable Remedies Available to a Federal Court After Declaring an
Entire Prison System Violates the Eighth Amendment, 1 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 101 (1972).
124 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972).
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required that the following procedures and policies, among others,
be instituted in order to reform county jails: a reduction of the
inmate population to no more than two per cell, a county-financed
study to investigate the increased use of pretrial release, better
lighting, the hiring of additional guards, completion of training
courses by certain officers, submission of a plan for psychological
testing of guards, immediate improvement of food services, the
virtual abolition of isolation cells and the presentation of a plan for
rehabilitative programs. And although other courts have taken a
less swashbuckling remedial approach, 2 5 the requirement of the
submission of a plan for reform and the retention of jurisdiction to
ensure that the plan is carried out have become increasingly
commonplace. 2 6
Wittenberg is far from unique. In Martarella v. Kelley,' 2 7 a
federal district court in New York imposed requirements on the
New York City Juvenile Detention Centers which included:
educational and training standards for personnel, standards for
in-service training programs, counselor-juvenile and .recreation
worker-juvenile ratios for institutions, detailed procedures for
evaluating the needs of individual children and ensuring that
treatment appropriate to those needs was provided, specific daily
periods of structured recreation, and the employment of an
ombudsman to deal with children's grievances. The court in
Martarella grounded its decree in what it termed "minimally good
professional practice," and the necessity of providing by judicial
decree requirements which would not be subject to political
pressures and changes in the responsible administrators. 8
The custodial care cases which employ detailed remedial
orders are not limited exclusively to institutions for criminal or
quasi-criminal incarceration. Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
"I' See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1972) (reversing district court
order that prison officials submit proposed rules and regulations governing disciplinary
hearings and psychiatric observance cells because "of concern for the respective roles and
responsibilities of federal courts and state officials" in prison administration); Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (reversing district
court order that prison administrators submit within 90 days proposed rules and regulations
governing political literature and disciplinary hearings). More drastic remedies, e.g., order-
ing prisoners released, are not unknown. See Curley v. Gonzales, Civil No. 8372 (D.N.M.,
July 29, 1970), discussed in Note, supra note 123, at 107-08.
126 See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972); Inmates of Boys'
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.
Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971); Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
127 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
128 Id. at 482-83.
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Rockefeller 12 9 required the immediate employment of 85 additional
nurses, 30 additional therapists, and 15 additional physicians; the
accomplishment of a 1:9 attendant-patient ratio; the use of
judicially prescribed minimum salaries for physical therapists; and
the submission of periodic reports on compliance from a state
school for the mentally retarded, some of whose inmates were in
residence voluntarily.
The similarities between the Wittenberg-Martarella-Rockefeller
situations and the administration of AFDC are striking. Program
performance is widely considered to be much below par;
constitutional rights of a "basic decency" or "fundamental fairness"
sort are involved; the programs are viewed as reformative or
supportive, and their performance evaluated in terms of those
purposes; and administrative attempts at reform have failed to deal
with the special conditions of the populace which is served by the
program. Moreover, in the custodial care cases, the courts are
taking a remedial approach which has much in common with a
quality control system. They are requiring that certain
management functions be routinely carried out by qualified staff as
a means for ensuring a continuous program performance which is
up to minimal professional standards. And in some cases, the
decrees call for studies and recommendations on problems about
which too little is known to formulate immediate guidelines.
Assuming that innovative remedial responses are possible, the
outline of a lawsuit requesting the imposition of standards of
administration which have a reasonable prospect of producing fair
and accurate results in AFDC eligibility determinations might look
something like this: (1) demonstrate the tendency of the program
to make a substantial number of errors; (2) establish a duty to avoid
those errors; (3) demonstrate that current management practices
are inadequate in light of the error rate and the administrative
duty; and (4) propose remedial requirements which will help
alleviate the problem. The following paragraphs cursorily fill in the
outline.
First, the error proneness of AFDC administration is a matter
which may be appropriate for judicial notice. This inclination
toward error was specifically commented upon by the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly. 1 30 There is, of course, the delicate
question: how many errors are too many? A perfect system will
129 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
130 397 U.S. at 264 n. 12.
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never be achieved. However, in a program which deals with "brutal
need," the courts should not require a demonstration of total
collapse before agreeing that agencies must do better if they
feasibly can do so.
Second, the duty of HEW and state agencies to assure accuracy
and fairness is relatively easily demonstrated. It has been argued
above that due process in the social welfare context should include
standard requirements covering program management as well as
the opportunity for adversary hearing. Moreover, and this may be
particularly important to judges wary of the rigidities of
constitutionalizing even hearing procedures, 131 there are statutory
bases for a claim for good program management. HEW has been
given authority to prescribe methods of administration which are
adequate to the tasks of the AFDC program.'3 2  On a
demonstration that under current methods of administration the
program falls far short of that accurate decisionmaking which will
provide benefits to "all eligible individuals,"' 33 the administrative
power to impose adequate methods of administration could
become a duty.' 34 This should be true particularly where, as here, a
dependent population is involved, and the administrative failure
has constitutional implications.
A state duty to decide claims fairly and accurately may also be
found in the due process clause and in the Social Security Act's
requirement that states provide aid to all eligible individuals. 3
Moreover, a duty on the part of states to ensure that there are no
systemic failures which result in different treatment of claims
among the various city, county, or regional offices of the state is
,31 For some extreme efforts to find statutory grounds for decisions which would
otherwise rely on constitutional due process, see Thompson v. Washington, Civil No.
71-2049 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 10, 1973); Marshall v. Lynn, Civil No. 71-1786 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 10,
1973).
132 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970). The Secretary has broad authority to make rules
"reasonably related" to the purposes of the statute. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
The Secretary may, for example, prescribe a 15-day advance notice of termination even
though no hearing is required in a particular type of case. Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d
603 (3d Cir. 1973).
133 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970).
,4 See, e.g., Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971); American Pub. Health
Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972) (detailed order in Veneman is published
in [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH F.D. CosM. L. REP. 1 40,749). See also Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
135 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a)(8), 602(a)(10), 1202(a)(1 1), 1352(a)(10) (1970). But see 42 U.S.C.
§ 802(a)(10) (Supp. II, 1972).
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implied by the Social Security Act's requirement that the state
operate a statewide system. 136
Third, given the statutory duty to provide aid to all eligible
individuals, and the constitutional duty to provide fundamental
fairness in the context of the program's goals and the realities of its
beneficiaries' needs, it would appear that only administration which
conforms to high professional standards should pass muster. It is
doubtful that such standards of administration can be found in
many state AFDC programs. The deficiencies of the quality control
efforts applicable to AFDC have already been outlined, and it is
likely that other evidence can be readily assembled to demonstrate
generally poor administration which affects the capacity of the
administrative system to produce fair and accurate results.137
Fourth, the same professional standards of administration
which provide the yardstick for measuring current administrative
practices also may provide the remedy for current ills. The
previous description of the practices of the Veterans' and Social
Security Administrations provides a reasonable checklist of
administrative methods for assuring quality in social welfare
adjudications. Further information can be developed from the
experience of private concerns which perform similar functions as
a part of their administrative routine. 138 There is no reason to
136 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1970).
137 For example, HEW listed 72 compliance issues with respect to public assistance
money payments programs for the quarter ended September 30, 1972. Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, Summary of Compliance Issues by Program, Report for Quarter
Ending September 30, 1972 (chart SRS-OFO-4) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). Listed
compliance issues vastly understate the instances in which state law or practice is not in
compliance with federal requirements. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 85, at 622-23.
And the Joint Economic Committee of Congress has reported that states and localities find
the public assistance programs virtually unmanageable. See IssuEs IN WELFARE ADMINISTRA-
TION, supra note 47, pt. I, at 1-2.
Timeliness, or the lack of it, is also a persistent cause of complaint and litigation. See,
e.g., Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (average processing time 56 to 93 days
despite 30-day requirement); Newsom v. Friend, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 360 (M.D. Tenn.
1973) (third suit against defendants in three years asserting noncompliance with time
limitations for processing applications for various federal programs); Boyens v. Madigan, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 117 (D.S.D. 1973) (applications for Aid to Disabled unprocessed for six
months, despite 60-day time limit on processing); Jordan v. Swank, CCH Pov. L. REP.
1045.05 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (preliminary injunction requiring defendants to make determina-
tion of eligibility under Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled within 30 days of application
for aged and blind and within 60 days for disabled); Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289
(N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd mem. 403 U.S. 901 (1971) (allegation of failure to comply with 30-day
processing limitation in AFDC); Langley v. Born, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 228 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (claim that San Francisco administration of Aid to Permanently and Totally Disabled
takes six months to process applications); see Pevar, supra note 11, at 69-74.
"' See Berkwitt, Quality Control: The Newest Executive, 100 DUN'S REV., Dec. 1972, at 93
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believe that administrative systems designed to discover, analyze,
and correct the causes of errors will not provide advances in
accuracy and fairness beyond systems which are not so designed.
Nor is there reason to believe that a court, with the aid of expert
testimony, with the monitoring of performance provided by
complaining parties, and with the manipulation of its full range of
remedial options, could not provide remedies on the management
side of due process which hold out at least as significant a prospect
for regularizing the process of adjudication in AFDC as did the
procedural safeguards imposed in Goldberg.
CONCLUSION
It may properly be objected that this Article looks at manage-
ment solutions to problems of adjudication and the prospects for
their judicial imposition on wayward administrative agencies
through rose-tinted glasses. Even so, there are a number of advan-
tages in thinking about due process in social welfare systems in
management terms.
The first advantage is that such thinking begins to focus
attention on the realities of the protection that can be expected
from hearings. The legal advance, made explicit in Goldberg, from
thinking about public assistance as a gratuity to thinking of it as a
property interest subject to due process protection is significant.
But the protections provided by viewing the requirements of due
process wholly in adversary procedural terms may be functionally
insignificant. Needs for protection which are identified as constitu-
tionally significant should not be met by an insignificant response.
Additionally, viewing due process as potentially requiring a
management system for assuring the quality of social welfare claims
adjudications begins to translate the legal issue of fundamental
fairness into terms which are meaningful to the people who ad-
minister social welfare programs. Their lament has continually
been that adversary process does not make sense in a program
dealing with a large volume of claims and an essentially dependent
clientele. In the view of social welfare professionals, adversariness
(outlining increased importance of quality control in business and industry); Kuttner, Quality
Control by Computer for Insurance Operations, 71 NAT'L UNDERWRITERS, April 7, 1967, at 1, 21
("A potential diminishment of complaints, plus a reduction of costs, should make quality
control a priority project for the progressive insurance company"). As with the proposed
quality control system for social welfare programs, Kuttner proposed a two-tiered process:
detection of "errors" plus their correction. See generally Welch, Professional Standards Review
Organizations-Problems and Prospects, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 291 (1973).
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tends to subvert the supportive role that the administrator must
play with respect to the claimant in order to carry out the true
intent of the program.
Finally, a management approach to due process suggests that
the arguments against the introduction of adversary procedure in
social welfare claims systems do not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that the judiciary should treat these claims processes as
peculiarities which do not respond to constitutional commands for
due process. Rather, those arguments may lead to evaluation of
what process is due the social welfare claimant in the social welfare
system's own terms. If an informal management process is due,
then surely that process should respond to the supportive purposes
of the relevant program. And, if the management of the claims
process fails to carry through those supportive purposes by assur-
ing fair, accurate, and timely adjudication of claims, the judiciary
should insist that management be restructured to provide reason-
able assurance that social justice is done.
In a perceptive and cogent article written in 1958,139 Harry
Jones posed the problem of due process in the welfare state in the
following terms:
Mass-produced goods rarely have the quality of goods made in
far smaller quantity by traditional hand craftsmanship; an
analogous problem challenges the welfare state. In an era when
rights are mass produced, can the quality of their protection
against arbitrary official action be as high as the quality of the
protection afforded in the past to traditional legal rights less
numerous and less widely dispersed among the members of
society?140
In my view the answer is yes, provided we are willing to reorient
our thinking about due process in a way which recognizes the full
implications of the changed context implied by "mass-produced"
rights. That we should do so seems imperative. For as Jones also
said:
In the welfare state, the private citizen is forever encountering
public officials of many kinds: regulators; dispensers of social
services, managers of state-operated enterprises. It is the task of
the rule of law to see to it that these multiplied and diverse
encounters are as fair, as just, and as free from arbitrariness as
are the familiar encounters of the right-asserting private citizen
with the judicial officers of the traditional law.141
" Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. Rzv. 143 (1958).
140 Id. at 155-56.
141 Id. at 156.
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